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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary international investment law is characterized by frag-
mentation.1 Disputes are heard by a variety of tribunals, 2 which often are
constituted solely for the purpose of hearing a single claim. 3 The law appli-
cable in a dispute is usually found in a bilateral agreement, applicable only
between the two states connected to the dispute, rather than in a multilateral
treaty or customary international law.4 Moreover, the international invest-
ment community itself is profoundly divided on many issues of substantive
law, meaning both that the interpretation given to international investment
law by a tribunal will be determined largely by those who sit on it, and that
even the most authoritative texts are recognized as representing only their
authors' own views, rather than constituting a clarifying statement of the
law as it actually stands.'
Given this context of fragmentation, it is perhaps unsurprising that
states negotiating investment treaties have consistently incorporated one of
the traditional means of bringing uniformity to international obligations, the
1. See Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of Interna-
tional Investment Protection, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 91 (2008). On the issue of
fragmentation in international law more generally, see particularly the contributions to the
Symposium, Diversity or Cacophony? New Sources of Norms in International Law?, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (2004). See also Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Aris-
ing from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study Group of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, I 4-8, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006).
2. Frank Spoorenberg & Jorge Vifiuales, Conflicting Decisions in International
Arbitration, 8 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBS. 91 (2009); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse,
Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 959, 977-81 (2009).
3. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competi-
tion Among International Economic Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 246-47
(2007).
4. THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
[ICSID], THE ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS 10 (2010), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument
&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English (noting that multilateral treaties have served
as the basis for only eleven percent of all cases brought to ICSID).
5. For example, in the 2010 "OGEMID of the Year" Awards, a survey of international
investment arbitration specialists, four of the six decisions nominated for "Arbitration Deci-
sion of the Year" were also nominated for "Most Surprising or Controversial Arbitration
Decision of the Year." OGEMID Awards, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, http://
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ogemidawards/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
Similarly, in 2008, the same decision won both categories. Id.
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Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause.6 An MFN clause in an investment trea-
ty is fundamentally a promise between the two states party to the treaty that
neither state will give to investors7 from any third state more favorable
treatment than that given to investors from the other state party to the treaty.8
If more favorable treatment is provided to investors from a third state, an ob-
ligation arises to provide equivalent treatment to those investors benefiting
from the MFN clause.9
While MFN clauses in investment treaties do not directly limit the
fragmentation of international investment law, they can serve to harmonize
the law under which foreign investors from different states operate.10 Absent
MFN clauses, states will compete with one another to ensure that their in-
vestors receive the most favorable treatment given by a particular state,
6. Stanley K. Hornbeck, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 395,
395 (1909) (describing the MFN clause as the "cornerstone of all modern commercial trea-
ties"); Marie-France Houde, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment
Law, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 127, 129 (2005) ("MFN treatment has been a central pillar of
trade policy for centuries."); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Most-Favoured Nation Standard in
British State Practice, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 97 (1945) ("The m.f.n. standard forms one
of the basic standards of international law, and it is not surprising that it can be traced back
to the dawn of international law."); Jacob Viner, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Ameri-
can Commercial Treaties, 32 J. POL. ECON. 101, 101 (1924) (describing the use of MFN
clauses as "a common practice of most nations since the beginning of the seventeenth centu-
ry").
7. An MFN clause in an investment treaty may refer to "investors." However, it may
refer instead to "investments," or even to both investors and investments. For purposes of
simplicity, this Article will refer simply to investors unless the difference between investors
and investments is important to the analysis.
8. Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?, 8 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 131, 131 (2005)
("[S]uch provisions require each contracting state to accord to investors of the other contract-
ing state treatment that is no less favourable than that accorded to the investors of third
states."); see also Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 96 ("Used in its technical sense, the
m.f.n. standard may be defined as treatment on a footing not inferior to that of the most fa-
voured third State."); Stephen D. Sutton, Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain and
the ICSID Secretary-General's Screening Power, 21 ARB. INT'L 113, 120 (2005) ("The prin-
ciples that apply are that any basic treaty containing the clause could attract provisions of
another treaty signed by one of the parties containing elements that are more favourable to
the beneficiary ...." (quoting international investment arbitrator Francisco Orrego Vicuna)).
9. Stephan W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-
Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 496, 502 (2009) ("MFN clauses oblige the State
granting MFN treatment to extend to the beneficiary State the treatment accorded to third
States in case this treatment is more favourable than the treatment under the treaty between
the granting State and the beneficiary State.").
10. Bryan Coutain, The Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Mainte-
nance of the Liberal Trade Regime in the Postwar 1870s, 63 INT'L ORG. 139, 146 (2009)
("[A] bilateral treaty is to a certain extent converted into a multilateral treaty by the uncondi-
tional most-favored-nation principle." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Houde, supra
note 6, at 129 (describing the MFN clause as "the multilateralisation instrument par excel-
lence of the benefits accorded to foreign investors and their investments" (internal quotation
marks and italics omitted)).
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thereby generating a diversity of legal regimes. MFN clauses, by contrast,
ensure that whenever benefits are given to investors from one state, they
must also be provided to investors from any other state with an applicable
MFN clause, thereby ensuring equality of treatment."1
But, while MFN clauses are potentially a means of reducing the level of
fragmentation in international investment law, they carry a significant risk of
overinterpretation. 12 MFN clauses are often described as being primarily a
means of eliminating discrimination within a given market. 3 However de-
11. It has occasionally been argued that equality of commercial treatment is a basic
principle of international law and so does not need to be secured via a treaty clause. As the
early twentieth century diplomat Culbertson stated: "[A]s a diplomatic representative of the
United States I took the position that ... equality of commercial treatment, as it is applied in
the most-favored-nation principle ... is a right of international common law and that a
government has the obligation to grant that equality." William S. Culbertson, Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment, 31 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 73, 74 (1937); see also A. Mertens, A
Defense of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 156 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 107,
109 (1931) ("Most-favored-nation treatment is not only a condition of economic equilibrium;
it is more and more coming to be identified with the regime of rights."). However, while a
useful political stance, this view is ultimately inconsistent with international legal practice.
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], MOST-FAvoURED-NATION TREATMENT, at 2, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10(Vol. III), U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.I 1 (1999) (noting that "MFN
is generally more than the minimum standard required under customary international law");
Houde, supra note 6, at 129 ("While MFN is a standard of treatment which has been linked
by some to the principle of the equality of States, the prevailing view is that a MFN obliga-
tion exists only when a treaty clause creates it."); Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 103
("[T]hough widely recognized in treaties by which States grant to each other reciprocal free-
dom of commerce, it cannot be admitted that that principle has as yet developed into a rule
of customary international law.").
12. As one commentator has noted:
Thus, if MFN clauses are viewed as having the primary objective of promoting
non-discrimination and harmonisation, then an adjudicator may consider that the
very purpose of the clause is to permit, indeed encourage, a comparison to other
[Bilateral Investment Treaties] to ensure that the most favourable rights, including
procedural rights, are available.
Elizabeth Whitsitt, Application of Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses to the Dispute Settlement
Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: An Assessment of the Jurisprudence, 27 J. ENER-
GY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 527, 530 (2009).
13. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 4 ("In other words, the MFN standard seeks
to prevent discrimination against investors from foreign countries on grounds of their nation-
ality."); Coutain, supra note 10, at 146 ("The MFN clause was devised to reduce uncertainty
by automatically preventing discrimination against treaty-powers and repetitive treaty rene-
gotiations every time conditions are altered by a new commercial treaty." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hornbeck, supra note 6, at 398 ("The object sought is uniform treatment
without discrimination."); Stephan W. Schill, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses as a Basis of Ju-
risdiction in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Arbitral Jurisprudence at a Crossroads, 10 J.
WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 189, 210 (2009) ("[T]he rationale of MFN clauses consists in cre-
ating a level playing field for foreign investors independent of their nationality.").
[Vol. 33:537
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fensible such a description is in general terms, a teleological interpretation 4
of this type risks allowing the goal of market equalization to override the
operation of the MFN clause itself.'5 That is, it encourages tribunals to lay
aside technical arguments as to the operation of the clause and simply
interpret it in the way that will most effectively eliminate market
discrimination. Indeed, this effect can already be seen in the discussions of
MFN clauses given by some investment arbitration tribunals and commenta-
tors. 16
The goal of this Article is to reduce the dangers inherent in such teleo-
logical interpretations by clarifying certain boundaries to the operation of
MFN clauses in international investment law.' 7 Of course, although MFN
clauses are a common feature of international investment agreements,' 8 the
language in which they are expressed can differ significantly, and such
14. For the purposes of this Article, teleological interpretation means an interpretation
of an MFN clause that is based upon the policy goals the interpreting body believes motivat-
ed the clause's adoption.
15. Moreover, portraying MFN clauses as a mechanism for eliminating discrimination
ignores the fact that an MFN clause does not prevent discrimination in favor of the benefi-
ciary of the clause, just against it. See, e.g., Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 96 ("M.f.n.
treatment does not exclude the grant by the promisor of additional advantages beyond those
conceded to the most favored third State. M.f.n. treatment is compatible with preferential
treatment of the beneficiary by the promisor."). Yet surely if the purpose of MFN clauses was
to eliminate market discrimination, they would eliminate all discrimination, not just discrim-
ination unfavorable to the beneficiary of the clause.
16. See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, 108-09 (Aug. 3, 2004) (allowing the claimant access to the more
favorable aspects of a dispute resolution clause in a third-state treaty, but excluding the less
favorable aspects of that clause, on the ground that MFN clauses relate only to more favora-
ble treatment); Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/9717,
Objections to Jurisdiction, 54-57 (Jan. 25, 2000) (holding that MFN clauses apply to dis-
pute resolution procedures on the ground that "[ilnternational arbitration and other dispute
settlement arrangements ... are essential ... to the protection of the rights envisaged under
the pertinent treaties"); Schill, supra note 9, at 568-69 ("MFN clauses therefore form part of
the ongoing process of multilateralizing international investment relations and constitute one
of the explicit normative bases of this development.").
17. It is, of course, not being maintained that no previous work has been done on the
operation of MFN clauses in international investment law. However, such work as has been
done has been focused upon specific issues relating to MFN clauses, rather than addressing
the operation of MFN clauses themselves. See, e.g., Alejandro Faya Rodriguez, The Most-
Favored-Nation Clause in International Investment Agreements: A Tool for Treaty Shopping,
25 ). INT'L ARB. 89 (2008); Schill, supra note 13; Ruth Teitelbaum, Who's Afraid of Maffezi-
ni? Recent Developments in the Interpretation of Most Favored Nation Clauses, 22 J. INT'L
ARB. 225 (2005); Mara Valenti, The Most Favored Nation Clause in BITs as a Basis for Ju-
risdiction in Foreign Investor-Host State Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT'L 447 (2008); Scott Vesel,
Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dis-
pute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2007).
18. UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that MFN treatment "is a core principle in
international investment agreements"); Fietta, supra note 8, at 131 ("The vast majority of
BITs in force around the world today contain some form of MFN provision.").
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differences will affect their operation. 19 Nonetheless, while attention must
ultimately be paid to the specific language adopted in each clause, this does
not mean that nothing can be said regarding the operation of such clauses
generally.2 ° Rather, it simply means that any limitations described here can
be eliminated or varied by states through the language they choose for their
specific MFN clause.
Part I of this Article will discuss the historical development of MFN
clauses in international agreements in order to provide the background
against which the current use of MFN clauses in international investment
agreements should be understood. Part II then concludes the historical dis-
cussion by examining the place that MFN clauses have achieved in
contemporary international investment law.
Part III begins the analysis of MFN clauses themselves by discussing
the limits to the operation of MFN clauses that have already been recog-
nized by noninvestment international tribunals. The limitations discussed in
this Part are important to investment law not only because they have been
expressly adopted by a series of investment arbitration tribunals, but because
the operation of MFN clauses in international investment law is ultimately
merely a specialized development of the operation of such clauses in inter-
19. Nils Eliasson, Investor-State Arbitration and Chinese Investors: Recent Develop-
ments in Light of the Decision on Jurisdiction in the Case Mr. Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic
of Peru, 2 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 347, 361 (2009); see also Houde, supra note 6, at 158
("The proper application and interpretation of a particular MFN clause in a particular case
requires a careful examination of the text of that provision undertaken in accordance with the
treaty interpretation rules as set out in the Vienna Convention."); Schwarzenberger, supra
note 6, at 103 ("It is well to keep in mind the warning voiced by Judge Anzilotti, and more
recently by Sir Arnold McNair, that speaking strictly, there is no such thing as the
most-favoured-nation clause: every treaty requires independent examination." (footnotes and
quotation marks omitted)).
20. As noted by one early commentator,
[t]he parties concerned should clearly express their intention; but it might happen,
and indeed it would often happen, that they did not do so. Provision must be made
in international law, as in municipal law, for cases in which there was no stipula-
tion in the text, and for cases in which the text was not clear and precise.
Quincy Wright, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 762 (1927); see
also UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 6 ("There is no evidence that, by using different wording,
the parties to these various agreements intended to give the MFN clauses a different scope.
Whatever the specific terminology used, it does not change the basic thrust of MFN.");
Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 104 ("Though there is no such thing as the m.f.n. clause, it
is equally necessary to emphasize that there is such a thing as the m.f.n. standard."). Another
commentator emphasizes that MFN has become a term of art:
'MFN' is a term of art in international law and treaty obligations employing this
term of art have an ancient pedigree. When state parties enter into modern invest-
ment treaties with an MFN clause, they surely do not intend to relegate the
received wisdom on the nature, scope and effect of such clauses to the dustbin of
history.
Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the
Rails, 2 J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 97, 99 (2011).
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national law more generally. 21 Consequently, although these limits were not
originally recognized in the international investment law context, they are
nonetheless applicable to MFN clauses in international investment agree-
ments.
Part IV then presents this Article's original analysis of MFN clauses,
explaining certain limitations that must be recognized in the operation of
MFN clauses in international investment law. These boundaries are identi-
fied as (i) the general inapplicability of such clauses to treaty provisions
already in place when the MFN clause was adopted; (ii) the need to evaluate
the alleged "favorability" of treatment by referring to the broad class of in-
vestors from the Home State, 22 rather than the particular investor invoking
the MFN clause; and (iii) the ability of an MFN clause to deprive an inves-
tor of access to the terms of the Basic Treaty.
23
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MFN TREATMENT
Study of the historical development of MFN clauses in international
agreements is of more than academic interest for any attempt to clarify the
boundaries within which such clauses must operate. Proponents of the non-
discrimination interpretation of MFN clauses, after all, routinely cite to this
history as evidence of the overriding antidiscrimination purpose of MFN
clauses.24 As will be shown in this Part of the Article, however, a close ex-
amination of this history reveals a very different use of MFN clauses by
states in which MFN clauses are used tactically as a means of gaining ad-
vantage over competitors, rather than due to any idealistic commitment to
nondiscrimination. Consequently, while a correct understanding of the his-
torical development of MFN clauses cannot by itself demonstrate that the
nondiscrimination interpretation of contemporary MFN clauses is incorrect,
it does serve to remove a convenient justification for adoption of this ap-
proach. Moreover, an awareness of the varied purposes a state can have in
adopting an MFN clause underlines clearly the need to attend to the specific
details regarding each MFN clause, rather than relying for interpretative
purposes on some predecided teleological conclusion.
21. On the relationship between international investment law and public international
law, see generally the essays in STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010); see also JCJRGEN BERING ET AL., SUB-COMM. ON INV.
LAW, INT'L LAW Ass'N GERMAN BRANCH, GENERAL PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW-A RESEARCH SKETCH ON SELECTED ISSUES (2009).
22. Home State will be used in this Article to refer to the state from which a foreign
investor is a national.
23. Basic Treaty will be used in this Article to refer to the treaty containing the MFN
clause.
24. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 9, at 512 (arguing that the adoption of the MFN clause
"was closely connected to the free trade movement in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries").
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Although MFN clauses have come to particular prominence in the eco-
nomic sphere, nothing about their operation restricts them to economic
matters, and indeed their original genesis appears to have been in a far
broader sociopolitical context. While the precise origin of the MFN clause is
still contested, one commentator has traced its use back as far as the early
Holy Roman Empire, 5 while others cite its development as occurring some-
time in the medieval period.2 6 Realistically, however, as an MFN clause
fundamentally constitutes just a promise from one state to another that no
third state will receive better treatment in some specific substantive field, no
conclusive "birthdate" is likely to be ascertainable. Such promises have, af-
ter all, likely been made for as long as states have entered into agreements
with one another.
Nonetheless, whatever the origins of the MFN clause, it was unques-
tionably with the rise of international commerce that they gained their
importance in international law.27 While the expression "most-favored na-
tion" only became common in the seventeenth century,28 the rise of
international commerce in the late medieval period saw states adopting
25. Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 97 (referring to "[ilmperial grants of customs
privileges to cities within the Holy Roman Empire on the basis of favours obtained 'by what-
soever other town' "); see also Eugene J. Conroy, The American Interpretation of the Most
Favored Nation Clause, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 338 (1926). Conroy notes:
There had been occasional crude quasi-most favored nation clauses in antiquity,
and a few among the commercial cities of the Mediterranean during the Middle
Ages, but the clause did not come into any sort of regular use until the seventeenth
century, with the rise of the mercantile system, and the bitter competition for trade
and colonies that it brought in.
Id. (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 14 ("The first example of an MFN clause
was when King Henry V of England signed a treaty (Treaty for Mercantile Intercourse with
Flanders on 17 August 1417) with Duke John of Burgundy in Amiens .... "); Hornbeck, su-
pra note 6, at 398 (arguing that the use of MFN clauses can be traced to as early as 1226,
when Emperor Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire signed a treaty granting concessions
to the citizens of Marseille that had previously only been available to citizens of Pisa and
Genoa); Houde, supra note 6, at 129 (claiming the MFN clause "can be traced back to the
twelfth century, although the phrase seems to have first appeared in the seventeenth centu-
ry"); Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 97 ("[T]he principles of m.f.n. and national treatment
make their first appearance in international law proper in the commercial treaties concluded
during the twelfth century between England and the Continental powers and cities.").
27. See Coutain, supra note 10, at 139 (asserting that by the nineteenth century use of
the MFN clause was central enough to international commerce that it can be viewed as hav-
ing had a primary role in "the maintenance of a liberal world economy in the turbulent
1870s").
28. Hornbeck, supra note 6, at 395 ("The phrase 'most-favoured-nation' first appeared
in commercial treaties toward the close of the seventeenth century."); John M. Kline & Rod-
ney D. Ludema, Building a Multilateral Framework for Investment: Comparing the
Development of Trade and Investment Accords, 6 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 1, 6 (1997) ("The term
'most favoured nation' appears to have originated with the 1692 treaty between Denmark
and the Hanse cities.").
[Vol. 33:537
Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment
MFN clauses as a means of ensuring that their traders would compete in
foreign markets on at least equal terms with traders from third states.
What is important for present purposes, however, is not the long history
of the MFN clause, but the limited form taken by early instances of the
clause. While contemporary MFN clauses are generally recognized as being
applicable to any benefit granted within a specified substantive area, 9 in-
cluding those benefits granted after the MFN clause comes into effect,
30
early MFN clauses referenced specific benefits already being received by
specific third parties and constituted solely an agreement to extend those
specific privileges to the beneficiary of the MFN clause. 31 That is, MFN
clauses were initially not generalized promises that no third state would at
any time be treated more favorably than the beneficiary of the MFN clause.
They were, rather, grants to the beneficiary of the MFN clause of specific
benefits already received by specific third states.
Early MFN clauses, thus, were unilateral, specific, and retrospective.
Rather than constituting an agreement by both states that each would pro-
vide MFN treatment to the other, they were instead an agreement by one
state alone to extend MFN treatment to the other (i.e., they were unilateral).
Moreover, they were not a generalized promise that no third state would re-
ceive better treatment than that given to the state benefiting from the MFN
clause. Rather, they identified specific benefits that were already being pro-
vided to a third state, and constituted an undertaking that these same
benefits would also be provided to the state benefiting from the MFN clause
(i.e., they were specific). Finally, because they applied only to the specific
benefits identified in the clause, they applied solely to treatment already be-
ing given to one or more third states. They did not, that is, require the state
offering MFN treatment to maintain the equality of the state benefiting from
the MFN clause by also extending to it any benefits granted to third states in
the future (i.e., they were retrospective).
29. Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
pt. 2, at 16, 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles], available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooksYbkvolumes(e)/ILC_1978-v2_p 2 -e.pdf.
30. Id. at 53 ("A most-favoured-nation clause, unless otherwise agreed, obviously at-
tracts benefits extended to a third State both before and after the entry into force of the treaty
containing the clause."); Comm. of Experts for the Progressive Codification of Int'l Law,
Rep. of the Sub-Comm., The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, League of Nations Doc.
C.205.M.79 1927 V (1927), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 133, 134
(1928) [hereinafter Comm. of Experts] ("'[T]he provision known as the most-favoured-
nation clause was devised to ensure to the contracting States not only the benefit of conces-
sions previously made but also of those subsequently to be made by either of the contracting
States.'" (quoting WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES 56
(1925))).
31. Hornbeck, supra note 6, at 399-400 ("In the beginning, this extension of favors
was made but to one or two specified states.... The next step was to extend the advantages
to include such favors as should be granted to certain other specified nations; then to include
advantages granted to any nation whatsoever.").
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Early MFN clauses, then, did not reflect any form of principled com-
mitment to equality of treatment or impose serious constraints upon the
freedom of a state to control its economic policies. Instead, they served sole-
ly as a mechanism for a sufficiently important trading partner to secure from
a state benefits that were currently being received by major competitors. The
state granting MFN treatment, however, remained completely free to pro-
vide more favorable treatment to states not mentioned in the clause, and also
to provide additional benefits to the named third states in the
future. MFN clauses at this time, then, were used only as a means of expan-
sive drafting in a context of limited information, ensuring that the
beneficiary state received all benefits currently received by its major com-
petitors, rather than only those of which it was at that time aware.
However, a significant change occurred to the structure of MFN clauses
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by which time the growth in
global trade and commerce had resulted in these clauses becoming a stand-
ard feature of international economic agreements.3" While earlier MFN
clauses had been unilateral, creating benefits for only one of the parties to
the agreement, in this later era they began to be predominantly bilateral in
operation, creating benefits for both states concerned.33 In addition, they
were now also usually both general and prospective, applying to any benefit
given to any third state within a particular substantive field,34 usually tariffs,
and to both already-existing benefits and those given in the future.35
Nonetheless, while states were at this point using MFN clauses as a
generalized means of ensuring that their traders were not discriminated
against in particular markets, it remains inaccurate to describe MFN clauses
of this time as reflecting an attempt by states to eliminate market discrimi-
32. Hornbeck, supra note 6, at 401 ("During the nineteenth century, the use of the
clause increased and became so common, in one or another of its various forms, that its ap-
pearance came to be looked upon almost as a matter of course."); Houde, supra note 6, at
129 ("MFN treaty clauses spread with the growth of commerce in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries."); Schill, supra note 9, at 509 ("[T]he function of MFN clauses changed under the
influence of mercantilist ideology in the course of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centu-
ries.").
33. Conroy, supra note 25, at 330 ("The [bilateral clause] is the regular form; the uni-
lateral clause is exceptional, and its presence indicates a position of hopeless inferiority in
the promisor nation.").
34. UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 13 ("It was only in the seventeenth century that the
point of reference for MFN was no longer a limited number of named countries, but any third
state."); Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 97 ("The privileges granted to the beneficiary are
no longer necessarily defined with reference to one or several specifically named countries
.....)
35. Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 134 (" '[T]he provision known as the most-
favoured-nation clause was devised to ensure to the contracting States not only the benefit of
concessions previously made but also those subsequently to be made by either of the con-
tracting States.'" (quoting CULBERTSON, supra note 30, at 56)); RICHARD POMFRET, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 17 (1997) ("The instrument for ensuring
that tariff reduction was accomplished by diminishing discrimination among trading partners
was the inclusion of the most-favoured-nation clause in commercial treaties.").
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nation. MFN clauses were, after all, even at the height of "free trade fervor"
in the mid-nineteenth century, used tactically by states. They were incorpo-
rated into agreements when doing so would provide political benefits, and
excluded when it would not.
3 6
This tactical use of MFN clauses became most explicit in the treaty-
making activities of the United States in the nineteenth century.37 On its
emergence into international commerce in the late eighteenth century, the
United States had found itself in an international market heavily geared
against it.3" As a producer of primarily agricultural products, the United
States relied on exportation of such products to generate the income neces-
sary to pay for the importation of manufactured products from Europe.39
However, European nations had erected large tariff barriers against the im-
portation of agricultural products, and unless the United States could
negotiate lower tariffs, its products could not compete in European mar-
kets.4 ° Negotiating lower tariffs was certainly possible, but if the United
States agreed to include MFN clauses in its treaties, as had become standard
by that time, each negotiated reduction would automatically be transferred
to every other nation with which the United States had an MFN clause.4' In
effect, the United States would gain tariff reductions from just one country,
while giving them away freely to every other European state.
36. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 33 ("Between 1860 and 1930 the principle of non-
discrimination governed the commercial policies of the major trading nations.... At the
same time, there were frequent deviations from non-discriminatory policies [that] ... pro-
vided evidence of governments viewing discriminatory trade policies as serving national
purposes."); Robert Pahre, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations, 55
INT'L ORG. 859, 873 (2001) (arguing that "MFN must be understood as a regime norm cho-
sen for political reasons independent of the tariff bargaining problem").
37. Tactical use of MFN clauses can, of course, also be seen in later periods and in the
treaty practices of other states. Moreover, MFN clauses have at times even been used as a
tactical tool for exerting purely political pressure, rather than merely gaining economic ad-
vantage. See, e.g., Theodore C. Sorensen, Most-Favored-Nation and Less Favorite Nations,
52 FOREIGN AFF. 273, 273 (1974) (discussing a bill proposed to the U.S. Congress that would
"deny to any 'nonmarket economy country' eligibility for most-favored-nation tariff treat-
ment ... during any period in which that country denies to its citizens the right or
opportunity to emigrate, specifically by imposing more than a nominal tax or other charge.").
38. Conroy, supra note 25, at 337-38 ("The introduction and rise of the conditional
form of the clause was due to... an attempt by the United States to break down the impossi-
ble tariffs and ironclad monopolies which the mercantile system, then at its height, had
established in Europe.").
39. Id. at 339.
40. Id.
41. That the United States' approach to the MFN clause arose from its concern with
control over its negotiating positions, rather than a protectionist opposition to low tariffs, is
indicated by the fact that even while insisting on the use of conditional MFN
clauses, the United States was quite liberal in its voluntary reductions in tariffs. Carl Kreider,
The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 39 AM. EcON. REV. 1039, 1041 (1949) (book review).
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The solution adopted by the United States was what came to be known
as the conditional MFN clause. 42 Prior practice regarding MFN clauses had
established that as soon as more favorable treatment was provided to any
third state, the state benefiting from the MFN clause immediately gained the
right to the same treatment, without having to offer anything in return.
43
That is, MFN clauses were unconditional in their operation. The conditional
MFN clauses included within U.S. treaties, however, required that in order
for the state benefiting from the MFN clause to gain access to any more fa-
vorable treatment granted to a third state, it had to offer the United States a
concession equivalent to that given by the third state. 44 If no equivalent
compensation was offered, no obligation to extend the more favorable
treatment to the beneficiary arose.45 Since the United States was the ultimate
judge of what constituted equivalent value, the conditional MFN clause was
effectively just an invitation to renegotiate the terms of the original treaty.46
The justification publicly offered by the United States for its insistence
on the use of conditional MFN clauses was that providing a benefit to a state
via an MFN clause without securing equivalent compensation to that given
by the original recipient of the benefit actually privileged the beneficiary of
the MFN clause.47 It therefore created precisely the inequality of treatment
42. The earliest known conditional MFN clause appeared in a treaty concluded be-
tween the United States and France in 1778. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 18 ("From its first
commercial treaty, with France in 1778, until 1923 the USA maintained that MFN pledges
must be interpreted as conditional, even when the precise wording of a treaty was unclear.");
Richard Snyder, The MFN Clause and Recent Trade Practices, 55 POL. Sci. Q. 77, 79 (1940).
43. Meinhard Hilf & Robin Geil3, Most Favoured Nation Clause, MAX PLANCK ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. ONLINE EDITION, 13, http://www.mpepil.com (search for "Most
Favoured-Nation Clause" in the search box) (subscribers only) (last updated Sept. 2009)
("Until the late 18th century the clause was exclusively drafted in an unconditional manner,
[i.e.,] the right to most-favoured-nation treatment would inure automatically as soon as a
third State was more favourably treated than the beneficiary State with regard to the subject
matter comprised by the clause.").
44. Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 135-36.
45. Chester Lloyd Jones, The American Interpretation of the 'Most Favored Nation'
Clause, 32 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 119, 123 (1908) ("Even when the second
nation offers the same nominal concessions as given by the first it cannot secure identical
treatment under the clause unless the treaty-making power considers the second sacrifice ac-
tually equal to the first."); Hilf & GeiB, supra note 43, 14.
46. Conroy, supra note 25, at 336 ("The claiming of a favour under the conditional
clause necessitates a great deal of negotiation."); Jones, supra note 45, at 122 ("What is the
character of the concessions which will be considered an equivalent is to be left entirely to
the treaty-making powers of the respective states. The mutual concessions are 'to be honora-
bly determined by the governments concerned.' "); Viner, supra note 6, at 122 ("The grantor
of concession to one country for compensation is itself the judge of the equivalent compen-
sation offered for the same concessions by other countries. If it does not wish to extend its
concession to third countries, it need only deny the equivalence of the compensation of-
fered.").
47. See, for example, the statement made by John Jay to Congress in 1787, that
[wlhere a privilege is gratuitously granted, the nation to whom it is granted be-
comes in respect to that privilege a favored nation ... but where the privilege is
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that MFN clauses were intended to eliminate.4 8 More realistically, of course,
the true explanation for the United States' adoption of this policy is likely
found in the power the policy gave it to decide for itself when it would and
would not give MFN treatment.
49
Contrary to any understanding of MFN clauses of this period as reflect-
ing a commitment to nondiscrimination, European states had no objection in
principle to conditional MFN clauses. 0 Indeed, although it was the United
States that came to be identified with the use of the conditional MFN
clause,5 it was in fact France that had initially proposed to the United States
not gratuitous, but rests on compact, in such case the favor, if any there be, does
not consist in the privilege yielded, but in the consent to make the contract by
which it is yielded.... The favor, therefore, of being admitted to make a similar
bargain, is all that in such cases can reasonably be demanded under the article.
Viner, supra note 6, at 104 (citing SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT 404-05 (2d ed. 1916)); see also Hombeck, supra note 6, at 408 ("The United
States argued for a more specific equivalent, saying that if they were to give France freely
that for which England had paid, France would be enjoying a treatment more favored that
[sic] that of the most-favored nation.").
48. In the words of the U.S. Minister to Argentina in 1897:
It is clearly evident that the object sought in all the varying forms of expression [of
MFN clauses] is equality of international treatment, protection against the wilful
preference of the commercial interests of one nation over another. But the allow-
ance of the same privileges and the same sacrifice of revenue duties to a nation
which makes no compensation that had been conceded to another nation for an
adequate compensation instead of maintaining destroys that equality, which the
'most favored nation' clause was intended to secure.
Jones, supra note 45, at 123 (citing 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 278 (1906)).
49. See, e.g., Henri Hauser, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: A Menace to World
Peace, 156 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 101, 103 (1931) ("[T]he United States
maintains that the rule of reciprocity does not preclude the granting of special favors to con-
tiguous states, i.e. to Canada and Mexico, nor does it prevent the United States from granting
whatever privileges it desires to its 'protectorates' in the Caribbean.").
50. See Schill, supra note 9, at 511 (noting that conditional MFN clauses "prevailed in
Europe until 1860"). This is not to say, however, that the Europeans did not have objections
to the way in which they were used by the United States. One commentator, for instance,
notes that
European countries, irritated by the repeated refusals of the United States to
acknowledge obligations under its most-favored-nation pledges and by the ex-
traordinary heights to which American protectionism was carrying import duties
on European products, began to denounce their most-favored-nation treaties with
the United States, to consent to new tariff arrangements only on a temporary basis,
and openly and otherwise to discriminate in their customs legislation against
American products.
Viner, supra note 6, at 126-27.
51. See POMFRET, supra note 35, at 18 ("The sole important practitioner of conditional
MFN treatment was the United States."); Hornbeck, supra note 6, at 405-06 ("This form ap-
pears in most of the treaties of the United States.... [Tlhe special limiting clause which
expresses the American idea and forms the basis of the American interpretation was first
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that a conditional MFN clause be adopted for their 1778 treaty.
52
Consequently, it is unsurprising that for a short period the conditional clause
became the norm even within Europe.
5 3
Nonetheless, in reality, the United States was the only state that truly
benefited from conditional MFN treatment, with the conditional MFN
clauses adopted by European states ultimately having the same substantive
effect as unconditional clauses. 54 While the inability of European states to
benefit from conditional MFN clauses is partly explained by the relatively
few instances of more favorable treatment being given within Europe at that
time, a more fundamental obstacle arose from the fact that all the major
trading nations other than the United States were already enmeshed in an
extensive network of unconditional MFN clauses when they began adopting
conditional clauses. The problem this created is that a single unconditional
MFN clause will completely undermine the operation of a conditional MFN
clause.
55
By way of example, presume that Germany signs a series of treaties in-
corporating conditional MFN clauses. As a result of these clauses, if
Germany provides a benefit to, for example, Italy, then that same benefit
must also be provided to those states benefiting from applicable MFN
clauses, upon payment of the same compensation originally paid by Italy.
As a result, Germany gains benefits that it would not have gained had its
MFN clauses been unconditional.
However, if Germany also has in place a treaty with Finland that in-
cludes an unconditional MFN clause, then Finland has the right to receive
the benefit in question without paying any compensation. The difficulty this
creates for Germany is that while it initially provided the benefit to Italy for
a cost, it has now provided the same benefit to Finland for free. Consequent-
inserted in treaties made by the United States."). Other countries have also made significant
use of the conditional MFN clause. See, e.g., Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 137 (not-
ing the use of the conditional MFN clause in Latin America). For excellent coverage of
Japan's practice with regard to the MFN clause, see generally Shinya Murase, The Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment in Japan's Treaty Practice During the Period 1854-1905, 70 AM.
J. INT'L L. 273 (1976).
52. See generally Vernon G. Setser, Did Americans Originate the Conditional Most-
Favored-Nation Clause?, 5 J. MOD. HisT. 319 (1933) (presenting the evidence supporting the
view that the conditional MFN clause in the treaty was originally proposed by France, not
the United States); Pahre, supra note 36, at 873 (noting that France wanted a conditional
MFN clause in the Franco-American commercial convention in order "to keep Britain isolat-
ed from the rest of Europe" and "avoid the suggestion that it was fighting a war of
aggrandizement").
53. Schill, supra note 9, at 511 (noting that the conditional MFN clause "also pre-
vailed in Europe until 1860").
54. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 17 ("In Europe the conditional form was often used
between 1820 and 1860, but was similar in effect to unconditional MFN treatment because of
the prevalence of single-schedule tariffs and rarity of special concessions.").
55. Id. (noting that "a single treaty with an unconditional clause rendered inoperative
any conditionality in MFN clauses of treaties involving the same countries"); see also
Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 102; Viner, supra note 6, at 119.
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ly, all the states with which Germany has applicable conditional MFN
clauses can also claim the benefit for free, this being the compensation paid
by Finland.
Because of the effect unconditional MFN clauses have on conditional
clauses, a state that has signed even a single unconditional MFN clause will
gain no benefit from negotiating conditional MFN clauses. Only the fact
that the United States was a new state entering into its first round of treaties
allowed it successfully to adopt conditional MFN clauses, and only a con-
tinued insistence on this policy allowed them to remain effective.56 Indeed,
the one time that the United States was forced to admit that an MFN clause
to which it had agreed was unconditional, it terminated the treaty as soon as
the first claim was made under it.57
While European states were ultimately prevented from following the
American policy of conditional MFN clauses, however, they were still able
to approach unconditional MFN clauses tactically." For example, although
unable to insist on compensation for the provision of benefits through an
MFN clause, European states would at times grant tariff reductions crafted
to apply to a very specific type of product.59 They would then argue that the
reduction in question was not given in violation of any applicable MFN
clause, as any state could meet the criteria in question, even though only one
happened to do it currently.6" Similarly, in 1891 Austria and Germany kept
56. Notably, it was not just the treaty-making powers of the United States that under-
wrote the consistency of the U.S. adoption of the conditional MFN clause. The U.S. Supreme
Court also interpreted ambiguously drafted MFN clauses in treaties as constituting condi-
tional forms of the clause. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 192-93 (1888).
57. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 18.
58. See, e.g., Olivier Accominotti & Marc Flandreau, Bilateral Treaties and the Most-
Favored-Nation Clause: The Myth of Trade Liberalization in the Nineteenth Century, 60
WORLD POL. 147, 150 (2008) ("British negotiators felt that MFN would enable Britain to rely
on France to make concessions to third parties; and Britain in turn would benefit without
making further concessions itself."); Hauser, supra note 49, at 101 (describing the incorpora-
tion of an MFN clause into a Franco-German treaty as having "a purely protectionist
origin"); Jones, supra note 45, at 126 (noting England's endorsement of the view that impos-
ing higher tariffs on imports subsidized by a foreign government did not violate MFN
clauses, as it merely eliminated a form of competitive discrimination introduced by the for-
eign government in question); Pahre, supra note 36, at 867 (noting that in 1881 Britain
terminated renegotiation of a treaty with France because France had refused to give Britain
the tariff reductions it sought, and Britain hoped to gain the same reductions automatically
through the application of an MFN clause in the British-French treaty to a French-Belgian
treaty that was under negotiation).
59. See, for example, the "Swiss Cow" case, in which Germany granted a tariff reduc-
tion for cows raised above a certain elevation, even if there was no other difference between
the cows in question. Draft Articles, supra note 29, at 31-32. This allowed Germany to pro-
vide benefits to Switzerland while not extending them to Denmark. Id.
60. Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 143-44 ("In order to be able to confer a
favour upon certain selected districts or persons, or respecting particular objects, without
extending it to all States with which the favouring nation has treaties containing most-
favoured-nation clauses, resort is sometimes had to conditions or limitations imposed up-
on the favour, which those whom it is designed to benefit will meet but which will exclude
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tariff reductions they had negotiated with one another secret until
further treaties had been concluded with third-party states. This secrecy
allowed them to negotiate compensation via treaty for reducing tariffs to
these third-party states, even though the states in question would have been
entitled to receive the same reductions without compensation through appli-
cable MFN clauses.61 More generally, European states would attend closely
to the order in which they negotiated treaties as a means of controlling the
benefits that they would gain or give through any applicable MFN clauses.62
As a result of such practices, by the end of the nineteenth century the
MFN clause had largely fallen out of favor with states. 63 Indeed, hostility to
the MFN clause was so strong in France that all its treaties containing MFN
clauses were denounced, and a law was passed forbidding the French gov-
ernment from entering into any future treaties containing MFN clauses.
6t
But this hostility to the MFN clause was relatively short lived, and
MFN clauses regained their popularity in the period between the two World
Wars. 65 Indeed, in 1923 even the United States came to endorse the uncon-
ditional form of the MFN clause.66 Notably, though, this was not because of
a newfound appreciation of the benefits of multilateral nondiscrimination,
but because the United States' continued use of conditional MFN clauses
had become counterproductive in the face of the hostility of its trading part-
ners.67 As a result, a practice of bilateral, prospective, general, and
all others."); Viner, supra note 6, at 109 (noting the use of "specialization," or "the fine clas-
sification of commodities and rates in tariff schedules" as a means of avoiding the impact of
MFN clauses).
61. Pahre, supra note 36, at 886 (noting an instance in 1891 in which Austria and
Germany kept tariff concessions secret until negotiations with Italy, Switzerland, and Bel-
gium were completed).
62. Id. at 867, 883-84.
63. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 20, 25 ("Between 1870 and 1914 trade became less
free and discrimination became more common.... On the whole the decade after Versailles
continued the post-1870 trend of increasing tolerance for discriminatory trade policies."); see
also Hauser, supra note 49, at 102 ("From about 1880 to 1914, this clause embittered the re-
lations of France with practically every foreign power .... ").
64. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 27; Hauser, supra note 49, at 102.
65. Hilf & Geil3, supra note 43, 17 (noting that despite a decline in the use of MFN
clauses in the immediate aftermath of World War 1, the clause soon became a common fea-
ture again in commercial treaties). But see Louis Martin Sears, The Most-Favored-Nation
Clause, 262 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 196, 196 (1949) (book review) (noting that
as of 1949 "the importance of the clause has diminished").
66. Culbertson, supra note 11, at 77.
67. POMFRET, supra note 35, at 23 ("The United States, with the conditional MFN
bargaining tool, received less favourable treatment for exports to continental Europe than did
free trade Britain, which had nothing to offer in return for MFN treatment."); Viner, supra
note 6, at 125 (noting the United States' failure to secure favorable tariff treatment through
the use of conditional MFN clauses).
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unconditional MFN clauses began and has remained the dominant approach
to the present day.
68
As the above discussion has shown, MFN clauses have simply never
been the generalized nondiscrimination provisions that some contempo-
rary commentators have portrayed them as being. They were originally
developed as a means of gaining specific advantages already offered to
specific third states, and, even when the generalized form of MFN treatment
became dominant, the clause was used tactically as a means of ensuring
market benefits rather than as a principled means of promoting multilat-
eral nondiscrimination.
The above discussion, however, has almost exclusively focused on the
application of MFN clauses to tariff barriers, as until very recently this was
almost their exclusive role.69 With the rise to importance of international in-
vestment law, however, MFN clauses have moved into a very different
context: one that is particularly problematic for the teleological nondiscrim-
ination interpretation of their operation. As the following Part of the Article
will emphasize, international investment law by its nature has far greater ef-
fects upon state action than does the mere setting of tariff levels for
imported products. Consequently, failing to recognize the appropriate limits
on the operation of MFN clauses within international investment law, and
interpreting them solely in accordance with predetermined teleological
goals, risks seriously impacting the appropriate regulatory activities of
states.
II. MFN CLAUSES AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
While the previous Part addressed the development of MFN clauses in
international agreements, no attention has yet been given to their specific
role within international investment law. Indeed, the exclusive focus on the
use of MFN clauses in international trade characterizes most commentary
on the topic, for the simple reason that tariff reduction was traditionally the
almost-exclusive context in which such clauses were used.
70
The growth of international investment law in the second half of the
twentieth century, however, has created a new field in which MFN clauses
68. See Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 137 (asserting that "[tihe unconditional
form is practically universal now").
69. Conroy, supra note 25, at 329 ("[Ihe most favored nation clause is a sort of re-
sidual clause covering all favors not otherwise provided for; but the chief purpose in
practice, and the only purpose of any importance, is to govern tariff relations.").
70. Id. (noting that ninety-five percent of claims made under MFN clauses are for tar-
iff reductions). However, there was some early recognition that MFN clauses would
ultimately come to have importance within the field of foreign investment. See, e.g., Wright,
supra note 20, at 761 ("It thus seems probable that as opportunities for foreign investment by
their nationals become a more important interest of states, they will make efforts to assure
most-favored-nation treatment in this regard.").
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have just as central a role as in the regulation of tariffs." Since a treaty will
usually take years to renegotiate, a state with an investment treaty that does
not include an MFN clause risks shackling its investors to an agreement that
has since been superseded by more favorable agreements negotiated with
other states.
72
Of course, as the obligation to provide MFN treatment only arises from
treaties, it was not until international investment law came to be dominated
by treaties that MFN clauses achieved their current importance within the
field. Traditionally, international investors had been protected through the
operation of customary international law, which contained restrictions limit-
ing the freedom of Host States 73 in their treatment of foreign investors.74 The
effectiveness of this law, however, depended to a significant degree upon the
identity that initially existed between those states serving as the sources of
foreign investment and those serving as the recipients. That is, because
states receiving foreign investments also had citizens and corporations of
their own investing in other countries, each state actively participating in in-
ternational investment had an interest in agreeing to at least minimal
protections of foreign investors.
Moreover, even where a developing state was the recipient of foreign
investment, the activities of the investors in question were often governed by
the developed state from which the investors came, rather than the develop-
ing state in which they were investing. This was because the vastly superior
bargaining power of capital-exporting states allowed them to insist upon
consular jurisdiction treaties, in accordance with which nationals of a devel-
oped state would remain under its sole jurisdiction even when operating in a
developing state.7 5 Consequently, the investor-friendly policies of developed
71. UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 1 ("The most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN)
standard is a core element of international investment agreements."); Gabriel Egli, Don't Get
Bit: Addressing ICSID's Inconsistent Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute
Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (2007) (noting that MFN clauses have
increasingly become a common feature of international investment policy); Houde, supra
note 6, at 158 (referring to the prevalent use of MFN clauses in investment treaties); Eduard
Kunstek, Procedural Effects of BITs' Most Favoured Nation Clauses on ICSID Arbitration,
15 CROATIAN ARB. YB. 97, 98 (2008) (noting that almost all bilateral investment treaties
contain MFN clauses).
72. See Houde, supra note 6, at 142 n.36 ("'[The MFN clause] contributes greatly to
the rationalization of the treaty-making process and leads to the automatic self-revision of
treaties which are based on the most-favoured-nation standard."' (quoting 1 GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 243 (1957))).
73. Host State is used in this Article to refer to the state in which a foreign investment
is made.
74. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 11 (2009) ("By the early 1900s, there was general agreement amongst international
lawyers in Europe and the US that there existed a minimum standard of justice in the treat-
ment of foreigners.").
75. Sutton, supra note 8, at 119 ("Many states entered into treaties (sometimes called
'capitulations') with Asian and African states as the result of which subjects, when entering
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states would apply even where the Host State in question applied fundamen-
tally different rules to its own investors.
However, the growth of genuinely global business in the twentieth
century, the rise to influence of socialist thought, and the wave of
decolonization that occurred immediately after World War II combined to
produce the collapse of the largely proinvestor consensus that had long
underwritten the customary law on the protection of international invest-
ments.7 6 The decades immediately after World War II, therefore, saw a
series of actions taken by a variety of states, particularly those newly in-
dependent from colonial powers, that would previously have been
regarded as inconsistent with international law.7"
It was against this background that, from the late 1950s, states wish-
ing to ensure protection for their citizens investing abroad ceased relying
primarily upon customary international law and turned instead to the sign-
ing of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).7 s While BITs generally act as
a supplement to customary international law, rather than as a replacement
for it, investors operating under the protection of a BIT need not rely on
the vague and elementary protections offered by customary international
law and can instead point to specific promises made by the Host State re-
garding the treatment they will receive. 9 In addition, if the BIT includes
consent to direct investor-state arbitration for any alleged violation of its
terms (as is now standard), investors have the additional certainty that the
rights granted in the BIT can indeed be enforced, even against an
into the territory of Asian and African states, remained wholly under the jurisdiction of their
home states, and their consuls exercised jurisdiction over their fellow subjects.").
76. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Pop-
ularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 641 (1998) ("In the years that
followed World War II, however, developing countries questioned the Hull Rule, claiming the
right to determine how they would treat investors and the standard of compensation that
should apply if that treatment was sufficiently harmful. This challenge to the Hull Rule
proved successful, and by the mid 1970s (and perhaps sooner), the Hull Rule had ceased to
be a rule of customary international law.").
77. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 74, at 18-19 ("Disputes over the treatment
of foreign investment increased and intensified after WWII as the process of decolonization
resulted in colonial territories becoming states. Many of these newly independent states,
along with the Eastern European communist states, adopted socialist economic policies, in-
cluding large scale nationalizations of key sectors of their economies.").
78. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 10- 1
(1995). The first ever BIT was concluded between Germany and Pakistan on 25 November
1959. UNCTAD, The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), IIA MONITOR,
no. 3, 2006 at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9. For a short but useful account of
the historical development of the contemporary BIT regime, see Egli, supra note 71, at 1048-
53.
79. Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 7 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008)
("Nowadays, almost all of the ICSID Convention cases that are being initiated concern such
treaty claims. The tribunals have, in these newer cases, all applied to the merits of the dis-
putes the provisions of the underlying treaties, as well as general international law rules.").
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unwilling state.80 This system of BITs has proven so effective that there
are now over 2000 BITs in force, enshrining individualized agreements
regarding investor protection between countries from all corners of the
world, representing all levels of economic development.8'
Nonetheless, while the innovation of BITs gave any two states the
ability to tailor promised investment protections to the specific relation-
ship existing between them, it also created yet another forum in which
states could compete for advantage. After all, as the goal of a BIT is to
encourage foreign private investment, it cannot achieve its purpose unless
foreign investors know of both its existence and its contents.82 Conse-
quently, BITs are routinely widely publicized and publicly available. 83
The consequence of this publicity is that each BIT negotiation is conduct-
ed with both states fully aware of the terms of the other BITs that its
potential treaty partner has already signed.84 Any state negotiating a BIT
will, therefore, do so with full knowledge of what it must do in order to
ensure that its investors are treated at least as well as, and ideally better
than, those of any third state.
The high level of publicity attached to BITs, therefore, largely elimi-
nates their usefulness as a means of securing already-existing treatment,
as such treatment can easily be identified and specifically requested.
However, it makes their role as protector against more favorable future
agreements even more important, as the public availability of the contents
of a BIT will ensure that states negotiating future agreements with either
80. Joshua Boone, How Developing Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOBAL Bus. L. REv. 187,
190 (2011) ("[A]lmost all of these treaties provide ADR provisions that allow states to bring
claims regarding the interpretation or application of a treaty provision as well as allow inves-
tors to bring claims against states for treaty violations, often referred to as investor-State
Arbitration."); Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under In-
vestment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 47, 53-54 (2005) ("BITs also provide procedural rights that permit the enforcement
of the substantive rights .... [I]nvestors can directly bring a claim against a Sovereign for
violation of a treaty, functioning in a manner similar to private attorneys general in the pro-
tection of the public interest.").
81. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 67
(2005).
82. It should be emphasized, however, that this statement does not mean that encour-
aging foreign investment is the only purpose of BITs, or that it means the purpose of a BIT is
to encourage foreign investment of any type under any circumstances. Such an expansive in-
terpretation of the object and purpose of BITs would lead to precisely the type of teleological
reasoning criticized in this Article with respect to the interpretation of MFN clauses.
83. UNCTAD collects an extensive index of investment treaties, many available in full
text and in more than one language. Investment Instruments Online, UNCTAD,
www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch 779.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
84. Of course, it is always possible that a particularly incompetent treaty-negotiating
team will not be aware of the investment treaties already signed by the state with which they
are negotiating. But given the easy accessibility of such information, it would be unreasona-
ble to presume such ignorance absent clear evidence.
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state party to the original BIT will attempt to achieve more favorable
terms than the original BIT included." Consequently, it is unsurprising
that BITs characteristically include MFN clauses.
6
MFN clauses in BITs, however, are of a particularly voracious variety.
Although in some treaties they will be restricted in their operation to a par-
ticular article, overwhelmingly MFN clauses in BITs are generalized
promises of MFN treatment with respect to all areas addressed by the BIT,
modified sometimes by certain limited carve outs.
87
The difficulty caused by this generality of MFN clauses in BITs is that
contemporary international investment agreements address an enormously
wide variety of potential government actions and are framed in very broad
and vague language.88 Consequently, there are few, if any, areas of govern-
mental regulation that can be said to be beyond the reach of a contemporary
BIT.89 As a result, while the traditional promise of MFN treatment with re-
spect to tariffs only constrained governmental action in a very narrow field,
a generalized MFN clause in a BIT can potentially be applicable to any ac-
tion taken by a government that affects a foreign investor.9 In their move
85. This does not mean, of course, that there will be no natural limits on the favorabil-
ity of treatment included in a BIT. After all, if the BIT imposes equivalent obligations on
both states party to it, then one state may be willing to accept less favorable treatment than is
already being received by another state, simply because it is itself unwilling to grant that
more favorable treatment.
86. See UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 13 ("With regard to investment, the development
of MFN became common in the 1950s with the conclusion of international investment
agreements, including BITs. The MFN standard was included in such treaties from the be-
ginning .... ); Houde, supra note 6, at 130 ("The inclusion of MFN clauses became a
general practice in the numerous bilateral, regional and multilateral investment-related
agreements which were concluded after the [Havana] Charter failed to come into force in
1950.").
87. UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that exceptions in MFN clauses in interna-
tional investment agreements are usually only applied in "explicitly-recognized" policy areas
such as taxation and intellectual property); Pia Acconci, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 368-69 (Peter Muchlinski et
al. eds., 2008) (noting that generally, MFNs in investment treaties are "unrestricted" and "un-
limited ratione materiae, ratione personae, and ratione temporis," but that in some treaties
there are exceptions and reservations).
88. See UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 4 ("MFN applies both in the trade and the invest-
ment fields. However, contrary to trade, where the MFN standard only applies to measures at
the border, there are many more possibilities to discriminate against foreign investment.").
89. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 146 (2006) (arguing that the substantive
impact of BITs on a state's traditional regulatory activities is so broad that investment arbi-
tration can properly be characterized as a form of administrative review of state action).
90. Moreover, there is clear empirical evidence that widespread application of MFN
clauses to tariff schedules provides benefits to countries of all sizes and economic power.
See, e.g., Kamal Saggi, The MFN Clause, Welfare, and Multilateral Cooperation Between
Countries of Unequal Size, 88 J. DEV. ECON. 132, 132-33 (2009); see also Madanmohan
Ghosh et al., Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional /Bilateral Trade
Arrangements, 11 REV. INT'L ECON. 712, 726 (2003) ("[S]mall countries are better off under
the MFN as it does not allow bilateral bargaining."); Kamal Saggi & Frank Sengul, On the
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from the world of trade and tariffs to the protection of international invest-
ments, MFN clauses have gained the power to impact significantly upon the
broad policy-making freedom of states.9
The importance of MFN clauses has, of course, long been clear, and at-
tempts to standardize the interpretation of MFN clauses by means of
international agreements have already twice been undertaken. In the 1920s,
the forerunner of the International Law Commission (ILC), the Committee
of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, undertook
the first examination of the possibility of a multilateral convention on the
operation of MFN clauses. 92 Ultimately, however, the Committee concluded
that "international regulation of these questions by way of a general conven-
tion, even if desirable, would encounter serious obstacles" and,
consequently, decided not to proceed.93 Similarly, the ILC itself addressed
the operation of MFN clauses in a project commenced in 1967, 9' resulting
in the 1978 Draft Articles on Most-Favored-Nation Clauses. 95 However, de-
spite several attempts to develop these draft articles into a multilateral treaty,
no formal action was taken, and again the idea of a treaty on the operation
of MFN clauses was ultimately abandoned.
96
While the work of both these committees is certainly important, in nei-
ther case did the work explicitly discuss the role of MFN clauses in
international investment agreements, instead focusing primarily on their role
Emergence of an MFN Club: Equal Treatment in an Unequal World, 42 CAN. J. ECON. 267,
269 (2009) ("We find that the formation of an MFN club enhances aggregate world welfare,
and the larger the club, the more desirable it is from a welfare perspective."). Similar evi-
dence has yet to be generated with respect to MFN clauses in investment treaties.
91. See generally UNCTAD, supra note 11, at I ("The MFN standard may also have
implications for host countries' room for manoeuvre in respect of future investment agree-
ments, because it can create a so-called 'free rider' situation."); Efraim Chalamish, The
Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 303, 305 (2009) ("Through their inclusion of most-favored-nation ('MFN') clauses,
these agreements form a complex network that resembles a de facto multilateral agree-
ment."); Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 89, at 146 (noting that because of the broad
scope of BITs, "arbitrators rule on the legality of state conduct, evaluate the fairness of gov-
ernmental decision-making, determine the appropriate scope and content of property rights,
and allocate risks and costs between business and society").
92. Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 133.
93. Id.
94. Endre Ustor, First Report on the Most-Favoured Nation Clause, [1969] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 157, 159, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/213.
95. Draft Articles, supra note 29, at 16; see also Houde, supra note 6, at 139 ("In
1978, the ILC adopted the Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and recommend-
ed to the General Assembly of the United Nations that they be used for a Convention on the
subject.").
96. Houde, supra note 6, at 139 ("The General Assembly did not act upon this rec-
ommendation and took no substantive action on the draft articles."); see also Stephen
Zamora, International Relations and Development, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 232, 239 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
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in international trade.97 This was an understandable emphasis, as interna-
tional investment law did not attain its current position of importance until
after the ILC had concluded its work.98 Nonetheless, the significantly differ-
ent context provided by international investment law limits the usefulness of
the work produced by these two committees for the interpretation of MFN
clauses in BITs. Indeed, it was in recognition of the new importance of in-
ternational investment law, and the importantly different context it provides
for MFN clauses, that the ILC decided in 2008 to resume its work on MFN
clauses, with particular consideration given to their operation in internation-
al investment agreements. 99
Up to this point, the Article has argued that the teleological nondiscrim-
ination interpretation of MFN clauses is both inconsistent with the reality of
the MFN clause's history, and potentially enormously problematic when
imported into international investment law. Nothing has yet been said,
however, regarding the boundaries within which MFN clauses should be
understood to operate in international investment law. The remainder of this
Article will be dedicated to clarifying these limits. Part III of the Article will
focus upon the limitations on the functioning of MFN clauses that have al-
ready been recognized by tribunals applying public international law. The
decisions of these tribunals have been recognized as also applicable within
international investment law, and thus provide the already-existing
limitations on the teleological interpretation of MFN clauses that currently
dominates the field. Part IV of the Article will then advance an original
analysis of the limitations that must be recognized on MFN clauses specifi-
cally within international investment law.
III. THE BOUNDARIES OF MFN CLAUSES AS RECOGNIZED BY
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Although there were relatively few decisions by international tribunals
regarding the operation of MFN clauses prior to the investment arbitration
decisions of the late twentieth century, three decisions from this earlier peri-
od are foundational for any understanding of the boundaries of MFN
clauses. The importance of these decisions lies not just in the temporal
97. Houde, supra note 6, at 139 ("In determining to proceed with the project, the ILC
acknowledged the importance of the role of the most-favoured-nation treatment obligation in
the sphere of international trade.").
98. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 74, at 47 ("The end of the 1980s and the
1990s witnessed an exponential growth in the conclusion of international investment and
trade treaties. BITs quintupled during the 1990s.")
99. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 61st Sess., May 4-June 5, July 7-Aug. 7, 2009,
IT 208, 211-212, 216, U.N. Doc. A/64/10; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2009). The cen-
trality of the impact of MFN clauses on dispute resolution in investment arbitration is made
clear through the ILC's research program's incorporation of the topic of "The Maffezini
Problem under Investment Treaties," under the supervision of co-rapporteur Rohan Perera.
Id. 216.
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priority they have over all later decisions, but in the approach they took to
resolving the MFN-based questions they faced. In each decision, the tribu-
nal in question rejected a broad teleological approach to the interpretation of
MFN clauses and instead recognized a specific limitation within which
MFN clauses must be seen as operating in international law. As a result, the
decisions of these tribunals provide three essential elements for any
subsequent discussion of the boundaries of MFN clauses in international
investment law.
A. Anglo-Iranian Oil: The Treaty-Boundedness
of MFN Clauses
One of the great risks of an MFN clause, the precise purpose of which
is to allow a party to an agreement to receive treatment not actually
promised in that agreement, is that it will be read as operating in an almost
unconstrained fashion. Since an MFN clause constitutes a promise not to
treat any third party more favorably, an unrestricted MFN clause might be
taken to apply to any more favorable treatment given to a third party, with
few limitations deriving from the context in which that treatment occurs. As
a result, an already enormously powerful clause would potentially be trans-
formed into a replacement for the treaty itself, gathering any more favorable
treatment offered to any third party while avoiding any restrictions.
One element of this problem was addressed by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in its decision in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case of
1952.100 The dispute arose out of the nationalization of the Iranian oil indus-
try, and the consequent losses suffered by the U.K.-based Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company.'0 ' For the losses suffered by the company during the nationaliza-
tion, the United Kingdom was seeking compensation from Iran under
treaties concluded between the United Kingdom and Iran in 1857 and
1903. 102
The question faced by the ICJ, however, was not the substantive ques-
tion regarding the obligation of Iran to pay compensation, but rather
whether it had jurisdiction even to hear the United Kingdom's claim.1 3 Un-
der Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ, the Court's jurisdiction can be
established in two ways. 04 First, both parties to the dispute can consent to
100. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1952 I.C.J. 93 (Ju-
ly 22).
101. Id. at97.
102. Id. at 97-98.
103. Id. at 95-96.
104. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. For a useful short account of ICJ jurisdiction, see
RENATA SZAFARZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE 3-14 (1993).
[Vol. 33:537
Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment
the case being heard at the ICJ. °5 Iran had refused its consent, and so the
United Kingdom did not rely upon this basis for jurisdiction. 16
Instead, the United Kingdom was attempting to rely upon the second
basis for ICJ jurisdiction, known as its "compulsory jurisdiction."'' ° Under
this approach, states are permitted to lodge a declaration with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations regarding the types of disputes they are
willing to have brought before the ICJ. °8 Once this consent is lodged, no
further consent need be given for the ICJ to have jurisdiction in any specific
case. As Iran had indeed given its consent to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdic-
tion, if the United Kingdom could establish that its claim fell under this
consent, the ICJ would have jurisdiction despite Iran's unwillingness to
agree to have the Anglo-Iranian dispute itself heard at the ICJ.1°9
The complication that arose for the United Kingdom was that Iran's
consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, which it had lodged in
1930, had been specifically restricted to disputes arising out of treaties con-
cluded subsequent to that date." 0 Therefore, as the United Kingdom based
its claim on treaties concluded in 1857 and 1903, the ICJ prima facie did not
have compulsory jurisdiction over the case. I1
One of the arguments offered by the United Kingdom in its attempt to
avoid this obstacle involved the invocation of MFN clauses included in both
the 1857 and 1903 treaties. 12 According to the United Kingdom, access to
the ICJ constituted more favorable treatment than the dispute resolution
mechanisms available under the Basic Treaties themselves." 3 Therefore,
since Iran had consented to allow some third states to bring claims against it
at the ICJ, these states were receiving more favorable treatment than was be-
ing given to the United Kingdom, and hence the MFN clauses in the Basic
Treaties required that the United Kingdom be allowed to bring its case at the
ICJ.
If one accepts the United Kingdom's substantive contention that access
to the ICJ constitutes more favorable treatment than the dispute resolution
procedures offered under the Basic Treaties, then this argument certainly
has facial plausibility. Nonetheless, it was rejected by the ICJ. Importantly,
however, this was not based on the ground that ICJ jurisdiction was not
more favorable than the dispute resolution provisions in the Basic
105. ICJ Statute, supra note 104, art. 36(1).
106. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1952 I.C.J. at 98-101.
107. Id. at 95; see also SZAFARZ, supra note 104 (discussing compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ in both case law and treaty law).
108. ICJ Statute, supra note 104, art. 36(2), (4).
109. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1952 I.C.J. at 103-04.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 108-10.
112. Id. at 108.
113. Id. at l10.
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Treaties. 114 Instead, the Court emphasized that whatever impact an MFN
clause might have on the provisions of the treaty within which it is con-
tained, it simply cannot alter the terms of any other treaty.' 15 That is, the
operation of an MFN clause is restricted to the treaty in which it is con-
tained. On one level this is an obvious conclusion, fully in line with the
traditional doctrine of res inter alios acta."6 However, its importance for the
purposes of interpreting MFN clauses is clarified by the fact that this rule
can, as it arguably did in this case, result in the beneficiary of an MFN
clause not actually receiving more favorable treatment to which it is unques-
tionably entitled through the MFN clause.
As emphasized by the ICJ, the restriction on Iran's consent to the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction that the United Kingdom was attempting to remove
was not included within either of the Basic Treaties. Instead, it was included
in a completely separate document."' 7 Consequently, since the operation of
the MFN clauses in the Basic Treaties was restricted to the Basic Treaties
themselves, they could not remove the restriction on Iran's consent to the
ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction." 8
It simply did not matter, therefore, for the purposes of the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion, whether access to the ICJ constituted more favorable treatment than
Iran was providing to any third state, and hence whether the United King-
dom had a treaty-based right to bring its claim before the ICJ. The United
Kingdom may indeed have possessed this right, but it simply was not a right
that the ICJ had the jurisdiction to vindicate.
It is thus simply inaccurate to categorize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Compa-
ny decision as constituting a rejection of the view that MFN clauses can
apply to dispute resolution procedures, as some commentators have done."
19
The ICJ simply never addressed this point.
By drawing this distinction between the existence of a right to more fa-
vorable treatment and the jurisdiction of a tribunal to determine whether that
right exists, the ICJ thus recognized an important constraint on the operation
of MFN clauses. Mere invocation of an MFN clause does not gain the bene-
ficiary all more favorable treatment currently being provided to third states,
as would a general nondiscrimination clause. Unless that treatment can in
some way be incorporated into the treaty in which the MFN clause is con-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 108-10.
116. GENNADII MIKHAILOVICH DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 58 (1993) ("According to the prevailing opinion, the sovereign equality of states
excludes any automatic effect of treaties on third states which remain for them res inter alios
acta."). Indeed, the doctrine was explicitly cited by the court in its decision in Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co., 1952 I.C.J. at 103-10.
117. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1952 I.C.J. at 108-10.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 20, at 101.
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tained, it is simply unavailable to the beneficiary of the MFN clause, wheth-
er it is indeed more favorable or not.1
20
B. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco:
The Temporality of MFN Clauses
Only one month later, in Rights of Nationals of the United States of
America in Morocco, 2 ' the ICJ recognized a further important limitation on
the operation of MFN clauses with respect to their essential temporality. The
case concerned a disagreement between the United States and France re-
garding the extent of U.S. consular jurisdiction in Morocco, 122 at that time
under the control of France. 123 While France contended that U.S. consular
jurisdiction only extended to civil disputes, the United States argued that it
also extended to criminal disputes. 12 4 As one of its arguments, the United
States attempted to invoke an MFN clause included in an agreement be-
tween itself and Morocco in an attempt to gain access to broad grants of
consular jurisdiction included in treaties concluded by France with Spain
and with the United Kingdom. 25
The difficulty for the United States was that even if it was accepted that
the grants of broader consular jurisdiction to Spain and the United Kingdom
did indeed constitute more favorable treatment than that given to the United
States, the treaties delivering that treatment were no longer in effect. 126 The
United States, therefore, was not attempting to argue merely that an MFN
clause gains the beneficiary state any more favorable treatment given to
third states, but that once a state gains a certain form of treatment via an
MFN clause, it retains that treatment even if the third state in question ceas-
es to receive it. As phrased by the United States, MFN provisions should be
understood as a means of drafting by reference, with incorporated treatment
120. One final important point regarding this case is worth noting, as it is far from clear
that the ICJ did not actually have jurisdiction over the United Kingdom's claim through the
operation of the MFN clauses in the Basic Treaties. Fatally for its claim, the United Kingdom
had attempted to rely upon Iran's consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Had the
United Kingdom attempted instead to bring its claim under the consensual jurisdiction of the
ICJ, alleging that the MFN clauses in the Basic Treaties incorporated Iranian consent to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, the court's argument rejecting jurisdiction would not have been appli-
cable. The ICJ may, as a result, have upheld its jurisdiction over the United Kingdom's
claim.
121. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (U.S. v. Fr.),
Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27).
122. Id. at 178-81; see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, American Consular Jurisdiction in
Morocco and the Tangier International Jurisdiction, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1955) (provid-
ing an informative account of U.S. law on consular jurisdiction, with a particular focus on
Morocco).
123. Rights of Nationals of the United States, 1952 I.C.J. at 184.
124. Id. at 180.
125. Id. at 190-91.
126. Id. at 190.
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retained as though there were explicit language in the treaty requiring that it
be given.1
27
While such an argument might have had some strength at a time when
MFN clauses were understood to operate purely retrospectively, incorporat-
ing only treatment already given to third states when the MFN clause came
into effect, the ICJ appropriately rejected it in the contemporary context of
prospective MFN clauses.12 8 Instead, the court emphasized in its decision
that rather than being a form of incorporation by reference, contemporary
MFN clauses are properly understood as a means of ensuring equality be-
tween the state beneficiary of the MFN clause and the third state receiving
the more favorable treatment in question. 29 However, to allow the United
States to retain the arguably more favorable treatment even after it was
withdrawn from Spain and the United Kingdom would actually privilege the
United States over its competitors, a goal inconsistent with the purpose of a
contemporary MFN clause.
In this ruling, then, the ICJ further reiterated that MFN clauses are not
an unrestricted means of states gaining the best form of treatment possible.
Rather, they operate not only within the limits of the treaty in which they are
contained, but also within the temporal limitations of the treatment being
sought. MFN clauses, that is, have their effect on an ongoing basis. Treat-
ment is not incorporated once and then forever maintained. It is instead
incorporated anew at each moment the more favorable treatment is available
to the third state. Consequently, once the more favorable treatment is with-
drawn from the third state, it is no longer available to be incorporated via
the MFN clause and is therefore lost to the beneficiary of the clause as well.
C. The Ambatielos Arbitration: Ejusdem Generis
One final limitation that has been recognized by international tribunals
addresses the risk created by the impact on the operation of MFN clauses of
the broad range of issues about which states enter into international agree-
ments. A state may, for example, be willing to subject itself to binding
127. Id. at 191. Even today, it is indeed quite common for MFN clauses to be described
as functioning via a form of "incorporation by reference." See, e.g., Plama Consortium Lim-
ited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 229
(Feb. 8, 2005). However, contemporary uses of this phrase do not contradict the ICJ's view
that incorporation ends once the more favorable treatment is no longer provided to the third
state, but instead merely express the view that MFN clauses incorporate by reference pres-
ently-existing treatment. Nonetheless, as Douglas has argued, even contemporary uses of the
phrase "incorporation by reference" are troubled, as they simply do not accurately describe
the manner in which MFN clauses work. Douglas, supra note 20, at 105-08.
128. In 1928, the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of Intemation-
al Law noted that there was "a difference of opinion" as to whether a benefit gained via an
MFN clause terminates once the more favorable treatment is no longer provided to the third
state. Comm. of Experts, supra note 30, at 140. However, in line with the ICJ's decision in
this case, the rapporteur concluded that the benefit should indeed be understood to terminate
when the treatment on which it is based terminates. Id.
129. Rights of Nationals of the United States, 1952 I.C.J. at 192.
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dispute resolution in the field of human rights, while remaining completely
unwilling to do so where purely economic claims are brought. However, if
the state has included an MFN clause within an economic treaty it has
signed, the beneficiary of that clause may argue that states signatory to the
human rights treaty are receiving more favorable treatment due to the avail-
ability of binding dispute resolution. Unrestricted interpretations of general
MFN clauses, then, create the risk that states will find themselves obligated
to extend benefits willingly granted in one area of law into a completely dif-
ferent area of law from which they may have been expressly excluded.
While the situation as just described was not itself faced by the tribunal
in the Ambatielos arbitration, 30 the ejusdem generis principle that the tribu-
nal enunciated has served to resolve this risk. 3 By virtue of this principle,
an MFN clause "can only attract matters belonging to the same category of
subject as that to which the clause itself relates."'32 The Ambatielos arbitra-
tion concerned a claim brought by Greece against the United Kingdom on
behalf of a Greek shipowner, Nicolas Eustache Ambatielos. 3 3 Ambatielos
had purchased nine ships from the British government, but after a delay in
delivery of the ships Ambatielos had experienced difficulties in making the
agreed payments.' 4 When sued by the British government in English courts
for the monies owed, Ambatielos brought a counterclaim arguing that there
had been a verbal agreement regarding the dates of delivery of the ships,
and that he was therefore owed compensation for losses suffered as a result
of their late delivery.13
5
130. Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (Comm'n Arb. 1956). The
Ambatielos decision was not an ICJ decision or a decision of any other regularly constituted
international tribunal, but rather the result of a state-state arbitration between the United
Kingdom and Greece. Id. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the tribunal has proven persuasive to
subsequent tribunals, and its holding has been uniformly adopted by international investment
tribunals as reflecting a reality of the operation of MFN clauses. See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 100-02 (Aug.
3, 2004); Emilio Agustfn Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/9717, Award
on Jurisdiction, 48-53 (Jan. 25, 2000); National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Decision on Jurisdiction, I[ 83-89 (June 20,
2006), available at http://italaw.com/documents/NationalGrid-Jurisdiction-En.pdf.
131. It should be emphasized that the Ambatielos tribunal did not invent the ejusdem
generis principle, which was already recognized as applicable to the operation of MFN
clauses. See, e.g., Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 108 ("For practical purposes it is essen-
tial to bear in mind the exact scope of each particular m.f.n. clause; for m.f.n. treatment can
only be claimed with respect to favours ejusdem generis granted by the promisor to third
States."). However, the tribunal's use of the principle has come to be a standard reference for
understanding its operation in international law.
132. Ambatielos, 12 R.I.A.A. at 107.
133. Id. at 9 1. For excellent overviews of the facts behind the Ambatielos award and the
reasoning of the award itself, see, for example, Kurt Lipstein, The Ambatielos Case. Last
Phase, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 643 (1957); S.E.K. Hulme, The Ambatielos Case, 1 MELB. U.
L. REv. 64 (1957); D.H.N. Johnson, The Ambatielos Case, 19 MOD. L. REv. 510 (1956).
134. Ambatielos, 12 R.I.A.A. at 91-93.
135. Id. at 93-94, 100.
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After losing at the level of the trial court, Ambatielos appealed to the
Court of Appeals, seeking to introduce new testimony from a British gov-
ernment official regarding the existence of the alleged verbal agreement.'36
In accordance with British procedural rules, the Court of Appeals excluded
this testimony, as it had not been presented at the original trial.' 37 The court
subsequently held against Ambatielos.131
Ambatielos turned to the Greek government for assistance, and, after
decades of failed negotiations, 139 Greece attempted to bring the dispute be-
fore the ICJ. 4 ° The ICJ, however, held that it did not have jurisdiction over
the substance of the claim due to a preexisting arbitration clause, and that
Greece and the United Kingdom were obligated to proceed to arbitration. 4 '
The existence of an MFN clause in a treaty between Greece and the
United Kingdom became a central issue in the arbitration when Greece at-
tempted to invoke that clause in order to incorporate a promise made by the
United Kingdom in treaties with third states to treat nationals "in accord-
ance with 'justice,' 'right,' 'equity' and the 'principles of international
law.' ",142 According to Greece, the refusal by the Court of Appeals to admit
the testimony of the British government official regarding the agreed dates
of delivery constituted a violation of this standard. 14
The United Kingdom's defense included the argument that an MFN
clause "can only attract matters belonging to the same category of subject as
the clause itself relates to," and that as the clause invoked by Greece applied
only to "matters relating to commerce and navigation," it could not be
applied to issues regarding what the United Kingdom termed "the
administration of justice."'"
Adopting the ejusdem generis principle, the tribunal accepted the Unit-
ed Kingdom's argument that an MFN clause only gives a right to more
favorable treatment that is given in those fields to which the MFN clause it-
self relates.'45 Consequently, in order for Greece to use the MFN clause to
incorporate the standard to which it had appealed, it was necessary that "the
administration of justice" be one of the "matters relating to commerce and
136. Id. at 94.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (stating that the diplomatic negotiations were commenced in 1925 and were
unsuccessfully resumed in 1949 after being interrupted by World War II).
140. Id. (stating that Greece finally brought the claim before the ICJ on April 9, 1951).
141. Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. 10, 17 (May 19).
142. Ambatielos, 12 R.I.A.A. at 106.
143. Id. at 105-06.
144. id. at 106 (quoting the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-Greece, art.
X, Nov. 10, 1886, 1886 U.K.T.S. 08252).
145. Id. at 106-07; see also Houde, supra note 6, at 127 ("The ejusdem generis princi-
ple provides that an MFN clause can attract the more favourable treatment available in other
treaties only in regard to the 'same subject matter,' the 'same category of matter,' or the
'same class of matter.' ").
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navigation."' 46 The tribunal held that it was indeed such a matter, but ulti-
mately also held that the United Kingdom's actions nonetheless did not
constitute a violation of the principle in question.'47
The importance of the Ambatielos decision for the present discussion
does not, however, relate to the final holding of the tribunal, but rather to its
endorsement of the ejusdem generis principle. By recognizing the role of
this principle as an essential element of the interpretation of MFN clauses,
the tribunal placed a further important constraint on the operation of such
clauses.'48 That is, just as MFN clauses are only able to affect the terms of
the treaty in which they are contained, so they are substantively circum-
scribed by the nature of that treaty. The mere ability of the beneficiary of an
MFN clause to identify treatment received by a third state that would also
benefit its activities, insofar as they are covered by the MFN clause, does
not entail that it has a right to such treatment. MFN clauses are not a gener-
alized means of ensuring market equality. 14 9 So long as the market
inequality arises as an incidental consequence of treatment delivered in an
area of law other than the one covered by the MFN clause, the MFN clause
has no effect.
50
Through these three cases, the ICJ and the Ambatielos tribunal went a
significant way towards delineating the boundaries of the functioning of
MFN clauses in public international law. However, while these boundaries
are also applicable to MFN clauses in international investment law, the deci-
sions in which they were recognized do not themselves address that field.
As the following Part of the Article will argue, however, the nature of inter-
national investment law itself imposes significant additional boundaries on
the operation of MFN clauses.' 5' Consequently, any understanding of the
operation of MFN clauses in international investment agreements must at-
tend to the specific nature of international investment law and cannot rely
solely upon discussions of the functioning of MFN clauses in public inter-
national law generally.
146. Ambatielos, 12 R.I.A.A. at 107.
147. Id. at 109-10.
148. This constraint can be seen as a development of the holding in the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company case. See supra Part III.A.
149. Contra Schill, supra note 9, at 502 (arguing that MFN clauses "ensure equal
treatment between the State benefiting from MFN treatment and any third State").
150. It should, however, be emphasized that the constraint placed by the ejusdem gene-
ris rule actually relates not to the subject matter of the treaty, but to that of the clause.
However, where the clause itself provides no clear ejusdem generis limitation, the nature of
the treaty in which it is contained can do so, as it provides the context in which the clause
must be interpreted. Houde, supra note 6, at 142-43.
151. Robert Howse & Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-
State Arbitration: A Reply to Jiirgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1087, 1088 (2009) ("[A]ny
attempt to merge trade and investment jurisprudence should not ignore the unique character-
istics of the investment law regime.").
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IV. THE NATURE OF MFN CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
This Part of the Article argues that three important limitations must be
recognized on the operation of MFN clauses in international investment law.
First, it argues that MFN clauses in international investment agreements
should generally be understood as granting access solely to more favorable
treatment provided after the agreement is negotiated, and not to any preex-
isting more favorable treatment.152 Second, it argues that the "favorability"
of a particular type of treatment should be evaluated not with respect to the
specific investor invoking an MFN clause, but with respect to the entire
class of investors covered by the clause. Finally, it argues that MFN clauses
do not merely provide to the beneficiary any more favorable treatment pro-
vided to a third party, but also simultaneously exclude the beneficiary's
access to the treatment originally promised. Moreover, these latter two limi-
tations can sometimes combine in a way that results in an investor actually
being harmed by an MFN clause rather than benefited by it.
A. The Instantaneous Effect of an MFN Clause
While no one would question that an MFN clause can have an impact
on the rights and obligations included within a BIT, MFN clauses in interna-
tional investment agreements must be understood as having an
instantaneous effect, independent of any need for the beneficiary of the
clause to invoke the clause's existence. That is, where State A and State B
have signed a BIT containing an MFN clause, the instant State B gives more
favorable treatment to State C than to State A, State A instantly becomes en-
titled to the higher level of treatment given to State C. 153 Although the
instantaneous effect of an MFN clause is not itself a boundary on the opera-
tion of MFN clauses in international investment law, it plays an essential
role in the existence of those boundaries and hence must be addressed first.
That MFN clauses operate instantaneously is not in itself a controversial
claim, as it is fully consistent both with the accepted approach adopted in
public international law and in decisions by international investment arbitra-
tion tribunals.154 Simply because an MFN clause entails an obligation not to
152. The word "generally" is important here. As the discussion will show, there can be
cases in which an MFN clause should be seen as applying to a specific example of pre-
existing treatment.
153. It should be emphasized that the effect of an MFN clause is only unidirectional.
That is, since only State B has provided more favorable treatment to a third state, only the
obligations of State B are altered. The obligations of State A remain unchanged.
154. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pa-
kistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 163-65 (Nov. 14, 2005)
(allowing the claimant to claim damages for violation of a BIT provision incorporated via an
MFN clause, even where the claimant invoked the third-state provision after commencement
of proceedings); Douglas, supra note 20, at 108 (stating that "investment treaty tribunals
have attempted to convert the fiction of automatic incorporation into a reality"); Houde, su-
pra note 6, at 142 (referring to MFN clauses as "ingenious legal shorthand to treaty
[Vol. 33:537
Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment
provide more favorable treatment to a third party than is provided to the
beneficiary of the MFN clause, the moment more favorable treatment is
provided, the state providing the more favorable treatment is in breach of its
treaty obligations.
There are, however, two ways in which an MFN clause could be under-
stood as having an immediate effect that will be referred to here as the
"right to claim" understanding and the "instantaneous obligation" under-
standing. The following Sections of the Article will detail these two
approaches and will then argue that only the "instantaneous obligation" ap-
proach to MFN clauses is consistent with the nature of contemporary
international investment law.
1. The "Right to Claim" Understanding of MFN Obligations
The first potential way of understanding the immediate effect of an
MFN clause is that as soon as more favorable treatment is provided to a
third party, the beneficiary of the MFN clause gains the "right to claim"
equivalent treatment for itself. That is, no immediate obligation arises for
the state providing the treatment to the third state to also provide it to the
beneficiary of the MFN clause, but once the beneficiary requests equivalent
treatment, it must be provided.155
The "right to claim" understanding makes a significant degree of sense
in the context of international agreements, as it maximizes the predictability
and transparency of MFN obligations,5 6 thereby minimizing the impact of
such clauses on the policy-making freedom of states. After all, while there
will be cases in which it is clear that treatment given to a third state is more
favorable than that given to the beneficiary of the MFN clause, in many cas-
es it will be disputable.15 7 States attempting to act in such a situation will
process"); Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 104 ("The object of any attempt to give legal
expression to the m.f.n. standard is to enable the beneficiary automatically to acquire the
rights, present and future, granted by the promisor to any third State.").
155. The "right to claim" understanding of MFN obligations in international investment
law has received recent support in academic commentary. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 20,
at 105 (arguing that an MFN clause has no effect until a claim is made under it and "does
not, in truth, operate automatically to 'incorporate' provisions of a third treaty so that all that
remains for a tribunal to do is to interpret the amended text of the basic treaty"). Unfortu-
nately, Douglas consistently confuses the "instantaneous obligation" understanding of MFN
clauses with the view that MFN clauses serve as a form of "incorporation by reference."
Consequently his argument does not really address the justifications behind adopting the "in-
stantaneous obligation" interpretation.
156. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance:
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law
19 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 09-46, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1466980
(noting that predictability is "essential for host States and foreign investors alike who need to
know beforehand what kind of measures entail the international responsibility of the State").
157. See, e.g., Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award, 54 (June 27, 1990) (rejecting application of an MFN clause where it was unclear
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face pressure to be conservative in the obligations they undertake with third
parties, out of concern that they may unwittingly also obligate themselves to
provide the same treatment to any states with which they have an applicable
MFN clause. By contrast, if the beneficiary is required to make a claim for
the more favorable treatment before it is owed, the granting state is assured
of knowing at all times precisely what its obligations are.
In addition, because no obligation to provide the more favorable treat-
ment existed until the claim was made, there is no risk of large backdated
damages claims, extending through years in which the state in good faith
did not believe any obligation to provide the treatment in question existed.
However, the "right to claim" understanding is significantly less desira-
ble for the beneficiary of the MFN clause than it is for the state providing
the more favorable treatment. After all, since the beneficiary is required to
claim any treatment before it has a right to receive it, the beneficiary will
need constantly to monitor the treatment provided by the granting state to
third states in order to ensure that it is not missing any benefit it should be
receiving under the MFN clause.158
The "right to claim" understanding of MFN obligations, then, ultimately
maximizes state policy-making freedom, but does so by minimizing the bene-
fits MFN clauses provide, as it creates a significant risk that the beneficiary of
an MFN clause will often not in fact be receiving the most favorable treatment
given by the state with which it has an MFN agreement.
2. The "Instantaneous Obligation" Understanding
of MFN Obligations
By contrast, the "instantaneous obligation" understanding of MFN
clauses eliminates any necessity for the beneficiary of the MFN clause to
monitor the actions of the state with which it has an MFN agreement. How-
ever, it also significantly increases the impact of an MFN clause on state
policy-making freedom.
Under this approach, if State A and State B have entered into an MFN
agreement, as soon as State B provides more favorable treatment to State C,
it is obligated also to provide it to State A. State A need do nothing to gain
this more favorable treatment, and in turn any claim it makes against State B
for benefits it should have received under the MFN clause will be backdated
to the moment the more favorable treatment was given to State C.
The "instantaneous obligation" understanding, then, emphasizes that
states entering into an MFN agreement have done so voluntarily, and that
the existence of such an agreement is simply inconsistent with allowing one
whether the treatment appealed to by the claimant was indeed more favorable than that deliv-
ered under the treaty containing the MFN clause).
158. It is worth emphasizing that since the "treatment" to which an MFN clause is ap-
plicable includes informal benefits provided by any level of government, rather than just
benefits delivered via treaty, the current accessibility of information on treaty obligations
does not mean that the monitoring costs involved would be relatively low.
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party to the agreement to violate it, so long as its counterparty remains una-
ware. 
15 9
3. The Justification for the "Instantaneous Obligation"
Understanding in International Investment Arbitration
Within the context of international investment arbitration there are clear
justifications for adopting the "instantaneous obligation" understanding ra-
ther than the "right to claim" understanding. There is, for example,
unambiguous international investment arbitration case law on this issue, and
each tribunal that has addressed the question has adopted the "instantaneous
obligation" understanding.
1 6 °
In addition to mere adherence to prior case law, however, additional
substantive reasons exist to support the adoption of the "instantaneous obli-
gation" understanding within investment arbitration, arising specifically
from the incorporation of investors into the investment arbitration process.
By incorporating direct investor-state dispute resolution into a BIT, the
parties to the BIT have thereby created a separation between the parties to
the BIT and the parties to any dispute resolution procedure that may result
from a violation of the BIT. Indeed, the existence of this distinction has tra-
ditionally served as a primary rationale for the adoption of investor-state
arbitration, as it is argued that allowing an investor to bring its claim directly
against the Host State serves to depoliticize the dispute by removing the
Home State from the proceedings. 6 '
However, if the "right to claim" understanding were to be adopted in in-
ternational investment arbitration, the Home State would be required to
claim MFN treatment in order for its investors to receive it. The Home State
would, therefore, be reintegrated back into the dispute resolution process in
a way that would raise precisely the politicization concerns that initially
served to motivate the adoption of investor-state arbitration. The "right to
claim" understanding, then, is simply inconsistent with one of the primary
rationales underlying the adoption of international investment arbitration.
159. For an interpretation of the operation of MFN clauses in accordance with the "in-
stantaneous obligation" understanding, see Coutain, supra note 10, at 147.
160. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 100-04, 197-206 (May 25, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 91 (2005) (ap-
plying an MFN clause to expand the meaning of "fair and equitable treatment" without
requiring a claim by the claimant's Home State); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi
A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARBI03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction
(Nov. 14, 2005) (applying an MFN clause to incorporate a "fair and equitable treatment" ob-
ligation into a treaty without requiring a claim by the claimant's Home State).
161. See, for example, the statement by Ibrahim Shihata, Secretary-General of ICSID
from 1983 to 1998, that ICSID was created "to provide a forum for conflict resolution in a
framework which carefully balances the interests and requirements of all the parties in-
volved, and attempts in particular to 'depoliticize' the settlement of investment disputes."
Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of
ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INv. L.J. 1,4 (1986).
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It might be argued that due to the delegation of dispute resolution au-
thority to investors, commencement of arbitral proceedings by an investor
should be treated as a "claim" by the investor's Home State to any more fa-
vorable treatment. However, there may clearly be situations in which a
Home State does not wish allegedly more favorable treatment to be claimed.
Of most immediate relevance, the Home State may not wish the MFN
clause in a BIT to be applied to dispute resolution clauses, as it has itself
agreed to more favorable dispute resolution procedures with third states than
exist under the BIT including the MFN clause. It does not therefore want
investors from the state counterparty to the MFN agreement to be able to
access those procedures.
It is, to be blunt, simply implausible to think that merely through the in-
corporation of direct investor-state arbitration into a BIT, the states party to
that BIT intended to give investors the power effectively to rewrite the terms
of a carefully negotiated treaty. The commencement of an arbitration by an
investor, then, simply cannot be regarded as a "claim" by its Home State of
any more favorable treatment currently offered by the Host State to third
states.
Under the "right to claim" approach, then, no tribunal could decide in
favor of an investor with respect to an MFN clause unless the Home State
had explicitly supported the investor's MFN argument. Yet such a require-
ment is not only clearly inconsistent with the desire to depoliticize
investment disputes, it is also inconsistent with the delegation of dispute
resolution to the investor, as it subjects a significant portion of the investor's
argument to an effective veto by the Home State.
The very structure of international investment arbitration, then, with its
incorporation of direct investor-state arbitration, requires that MFN clauses
in international investment agreements be interpreted in accordance with the
"instantaneous obligation" understanding, as a result of which any more fa-
vorable treatment delivered by State B to State C is instantly owed to State
A, without requiring any form of claim to the treatment to be made by State
A. The following Section demonstrates how this aspect of MFN clauses in
international investment law creates an important boundary for their func-
tioning in this field that does not apply to MFN clauses in public
international law generally.
B. The Predominantly Forward-Looking Nature of MFN
Clauses in International Investment Arbitration
The preceding Section addressed one element of what can be called the
"temporality" of MFN clauses, or the way in which they are fundamentally
enmeshed in considerations regarding time. As seen in that discussion, MFN
clauses in international investment arbitration must be understood as having
their effect the instant more favorable treatment is provided to a third state.
This Section of the Article demonstrates the impact of this instantaneous ef-
fect on the applicability of MFN clauses to more favorable treatment already
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existing when the MFN clause came into effect. Specifically, it will be ar-
gued that an MFN clause in an investment treaty should not usually be
understood as giving the beneficiary of the clause access to more favorable
treatment in a preexisting third-party treaty, although it can give access to
preexisting nontreaty treatment. This is a particularly important limitation
on the operation of MFN clauses in international investment law, as there
has traditionally been no controversy regarding the applicability of MFN
clauses to preexisting treatment.162
1. The Role of Intent in Interpreting MFN Clauses in
Investment Treaties
The approach to MFN clauses advanced in this Article relies heavily
upon arguments regarding what can plausibly be said to have been intended
by the states party to a BIT when they decide to incorporate an MFN clause
into their treaty. There is, however, a significant difference of opinion
amongst legal commentators regarding the relevance to treaty interpretation
of the subjective intentions of the Contracting States. This Subsection there-
fore lays out the justification for appealing to party intent in interpreting
MFN clauses.
Although it is uncontested that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 16 3 are the touchstone for
interpretation of any BIT,164 there is still significant disagreement among
commentators regarding their precise meaning. While few, if any, commen-
tators would deny that the VCLT gives primacy to the text of a treaty over
any textually unexpressed intentions of the contracting states, disagreement
exists regarding how strong this preference for "text" over "intention" actu-
ally is. Most controversially, commentators are split regarding whether clear
evidence that the text as adopted does not accurately reflect the intentions of
162. Indeed, in the early twentieth century the controversy concerned whether MFN
clauses applied to future treatment, not preexisting treatment. Comm. of Experts, supra note
30, at 140 ("Whether or not the clause applies to future as well as to past favours is much
discussed by writers, although no actual case has been found in which the question was
raised."); Thomas Barclay, Effect of 'Most-Favored-Nation' Clause in Commercial Treaties,
17 YALE L.J. 26, 31 (1907) (noting the view of a prominent French commentator that an
MFN clause "must be considered as implying everything that existed at the moment when
signed, but that it could not be considered to extend to anything later in date").
163. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (setting forth the rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, including the basic rule that a treaty must be interpreted according to the "ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose").
164. See, e.g., JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 47 (2011) ("Starting point for most tribunals is Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties."); Schill, supra note 13, at 205-06 (criticizing the interpretation of
MFN clauses in accordance with the intentions of the contracting parties as inconsistent with
the VCLT).
Spring 2012]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the contracting states should suffice to overrule otherwise clear treaty lan-
guage, or if states must instead simply live with the agreements they sign.
16 5
The source of this disagreement lies in the language adopted in Articles
31 and 32 of the VCLT. It is unquestionably true that Article 31 of the
VCLT gives primacy to the text of the treaty, rather than to the subjective in-
tentions of the parties, adopting as its fundamental rule that treaties be
interpreted "in accordance to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose."' 66 While this rule is admittedly framed in a
way that gives recognition to the intentions of the parties, requiring interpre-
tation in accordance with the "object and purpose" of the treaty, this
recognition applies solely with respect to interpretation of the written lan-
guage. Consequently, it cannot justify giving any reading to a clause not
directly based upon the actual language of the treaty.
The complication arises, however, when proper consideration is given
to Article 32 of the VCLT, regarding the use of "supplementary means of in-
terpretation," such as "the preparatory work of the treaty."'167 Article 32 lays
out a two-step process in which an interpretation is initially developed under
Article 31, but is then tested against supplementary means of interpretation
to either "confirm" the interpretation arrived at under Article 31 or to derive
a different interpretation where the interpretation arrived at under Article 31
left the treaty language either "ambiguous or obscure" or "manifestly absurd
or unreasonable."'
168
It is the recognition in Article 32 that supplementary means of interpre-
tation can be used to "confirm" an interpretation reached under Article 31
that creates the difficulty for a purely textualist interpretation of the VCLT,
as this option is listed separately to situations in which the treaty language
remains "ambiguous" or "absurd."' 6 9 That is, it is not first necessary for the
interpretation reached via Article 31 to be clearly flawed in some way for
supplementary means of interpretation be used to "confirm" its correctness.
There is, however, little point in confirming the correctness of an inter-
pretation if that interpretation cannot be rejected when shown to be wrong.
It must, therefore, be the case, as recognized by commentators such as Ste-
phen Schwebel, former President of the ICJ, that clear evidence of the
intentions of contracting states can override even apparently clear treaty
language.
70
165. In support of a broad interpretation, see, for instance, Emmanuel Gaillard, Interna-
tional Arbitration Law: Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored-Nation Clause,
233 N.Y. L.J. 1, 3 (2005). In support of a narrow interpretation, see, for instance, Vesel, su-
pra note 17, at 175.
166. VCLT, supra note 163, art. 31.
167. Id. art. 32.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Stephen M. Schwebel, May Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct Rather than
Confirm the 'Clear' Meaning of a Treaty Provision?, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT
THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 541, 546 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996); see also AN-
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Even on this understanding of the VCLT, of course, the text retains its
centrality in interpretation. Otherwise Article 31's emphasis on the text
would be nonsensical. However, this emphasis on the text can be understood
as simply requiring a high level of certainty regarding the subjective inten-
tions of the parties to the treaty if apparently clear language is to be
overridden. That is, clear treaty language overrides vague indications of
contrary party intent, but where party intent is sufficiently clear, even appar-
ently clear treaty language must give way to it.
The subjective intentions of the states party to a BIT are, therefore, al-
ways important in the interpretation of the provisions of the BIT, including
an MFN clause, even though they remain subsidiary to the language of the
BIT itself.
2. Party Intent as to the Extension of MFN Clauses to
Already-Existing More Favorable Treatment
Once it has been accepted, however, that party intent can correct even
otherwise clear treaty language, an important conclusion can be drawn re-
garding the operation of MFN clauses. Specifically, it will be argued in this
Subsection of the Article that parties usually cannot plausibly be understood
to have intended an MFN clause in an investment treaty to grant the benefi-
ciary of the clause access to more favorable provisions present in other
investment treaties already in effect when the Basic Treaty came into
force.17 ' Consequently, even where the text of the MFN clause would itself
seem to allow such an application, the clear intent of the parties should be
taken to override the language of the clause.
The justification for this preclusion of already-existing treaty provisions
from coverage by an MFN clause in a BIT derives directly from the instan-
taneous obligations that arise as a result of such clauses, as discussed above.
To illustrate with an example, presume that in 1995 States A and B sign an
investment treaty including an MFN clause, as well as including a fair and
equitable treatment clause' restricted in certain ways. However, States B
and C had already signed, in 1992, an investment treaty containing an
THONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 197 (2000). For the opposing view, see
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Interpreting Treaties for the Benefit of Third
Parties: The "Salvors' Doctrine" and the Use of Legislative History in Investment Treaties,
104 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 597 (2010); Ulf Linderfalk, Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation, 54
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 133, 138 (2007).
171. Contra Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 30th Sess., May 8-July 28, 1978, U.N.
Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt. 2, at 8, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.l (describing as "obviously" true that MFN clauses apply to "ben-
efits extended to a third State both before and after the entry into force of the treaty
containing the clause").
172. On the meaning of "fair and equitable treatment" in international investment law,
see Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD IN-
VEST. TRADE 357, 357 (2005).
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unrestricted fair and equitable treatment clause. If the MFN clause in the A-
B treaty is understood as applying to treaty provisions already in existence
when the A-B treaty comes into force, then investors from State A are actu-
ally covered by an unrestricted fair and equitable treatment clause, despite
the restrictions explicitly incorporated into the A-B treaty.
The implausibility that parties to the treaty intended this situation de-
rives not from the fact that the parties to the A-B BIT are receiving
treatment other than that promised them in the BIT, as that is an inherent
consequence of the operation of an MFN clause. Rather, the implausibility
results because, due to the instantaneous effect of MFN clauses, the removal
of the restrictions on the fair and equitable treatment obligation included in
the A-B treaty occurred the instant the A-B treaty came into force. That is,
there was no point at which the fair and equitable treatment clause expressly
negotiated between States A and B was actually in effect between them.
Such a situation, however, simply makes incomprehensible the inclusion of
the restrictions in question within the treaty. 1
73
Nevertheless, as established above, sufficiently strong evidence of party
intent can suffice to override otherwise clear treaty language. 174 Consequent-
ly, the sheer implausibility that States A and B negotiated treaty language
that would have absolutely no effect might justify precluding the application
of the MFN clause in the A-B treaty to the fair and equitable treatment
clause in the B-C treaty. That is, although the language of the MFN clause
itself is unrestricted, an exception is read into the clause that prevents it be-
ing applied to any more favorable treaty provisions already in effect at the
time the A-B treaty came into force.
The difficulty with such an argument is that, as noted in the historical
survey earlier in the Article, MFN clauses have traditionally been recog-
nized as applying to already-existing treatment.175 Indeed, it has been argued
that one of the primary purposes of an MFN clause is to reassure treaty ne-
gotiators that they have secured the best available treatment for their state,
173. Notably, just prior to this Article going to print, this argument, which has been un-
successfully advocated by the Author since early 2010, was accepted for the first time by a
tribunal. See ICS Inspection and Control Services Ltd. (U.K.) v. Republic of Argentina,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on Jurisdiction, 317 (Feb. 10, 2012), available
at http://italaw.com/documents/ICS v_ArgentinaAwardJurisdiction_10Feb2012-En.pdf (re-
jecting application of an MFN clause to dispute resolution provisions as "the 18-month
litigation prerequisite would have been void ab initio-immediately superseded by means of
the treaties' MFN clauses"). Unfortunately, the tribunal failed to address the complexities
discussed in the remainder of this Section, relying instead simply on the presumed under-
standing of the extent of the MFN clause on the part of one state party to the BIT. Such an
approach, though, is inconsistent with basic rules of treaty interpretation, in which the sub-
jective understanding of a single party cannot determine the meaning of a treaty provision.
See, e.g., ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ThEATIEs 205 (2007) (" '[T]he ob-
ject and purpose' of a treaty can hardly be anything other than the object and purpose, which
the parties to the treaty intended it to have--or rather, more specifically, mutually intended it
to have.").
174. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
175. See supra Part I.
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rather than leaving them with the burden of discovering every form of
treatment the counterparty to the treaty is providing to third states.
176
It is at this point that the distinctively public nature of investment trea-
ties becomes important. Unlike most treaties, investment treaties are
expressly designed to be broadly publicized. After all, states enter into in-
vestment treaties as a means of attracting private investment from abroad. 177
The entire purpose of such a treaty, then, would be undermined were it to be
kept secret, or even just not made broadly available. As a result, information
on the investment treaties signed by states is easily available, even to the ex-
tent of being collected on publicly accessible websites.
17
1
The consequence of this public nature of investment treaties for the in-
terpretation of MFN clauses is that it is simply implausible that states
incorporated an MFN clause into their treaty as a protection against un-
known already-existing BIT-based treatment. The information on such
treatment is simply too easily accessible. 79 To return to the example above,
if unrestricted fair and equitable treatment had been discussed in the negoti-
ations between States A and B, State B could have insisted that State A
grant some countervailing benefit. However, if it is subsequently incorpo-
rated via an MFN clause, no compensation is given, and State B has
effectively granted unrestricted fair and equitable treatment for free. Absent
evidence to the contrary, then, it is simply implausible to read an MFN
clause in a BIT as referring to already-existing provisions in a third-state
BIT.
The precise nature of the position being maintained here should be em-
phasized. It is not being argued that the MFN clause in the A-B BIT should
be understood as including an exception specifically precluding its applica-
bility to the already-existing B-C BIT. Rather, the exception in question is a
generalized one, referring to any preexisting BIT-based treatment. It does
not require that the parties have identified the BITs in question in any way.
It is important to note, however, that since this argument is premised
upon the publicity attached to BITs, it will be far less applicable to
non-treaty-based treatment or to treaties that have not received significant
publicity. Where the treatment granted to a third state constitutes, for exam-
ple, an administrative practice, any tribunal addressing the applicability of
176. Schwarzenberger, supra note 6, at 99 ("It is clear the m.f.n. clauses serve as an in-
surance against incompetent draftsmanship and lack of imagination on the part of those who
are responsible for the conclusion of international treaties.").
177. UNCTAD, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACT-
ING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at xi, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.II.D.20 (2009) (noting that international
investment agreements are "a key instrument in the strategies of most countries, in particular
developing countries, to attract foreign investment").
178. See, e.g., Investment Instruments Online, supra note 83.
179. Importantly, though, this rationale only applies to BIT-based treatment, as infor-
mation on other types of treatment of investors may be less easily accessed. See supra note
158 and accompanying text.
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an MFN clause must undertake an analysis of the accessibility to the con-
tracting states of information on the practice. Only if the availability of
information on the practice reaches a level corresponding to the publicity at-
tached to BITs will the current argument be applicable. 1 °
Nonetheless, as argued above, using the intentions of the parties to
override otherwise clear treaty language is only appropriate when those in-
tentions can be clearly ascertained, and it might be argued that the mere
implausibility that states would knowingly agree to an MFN clause that au-
tomatically deleted negotiated treaty language does not rise to the level of
certainty required by the VCLT. After all, it is certainly possible that the in-
dividuals negotiating the treaty simply adopted the general MFN clause
without a full awareness of its effects. In such a situation, however, there
would be no intent to exclude preexisting BIT provisions.
The following Subsection of the Article offers an alternative argument
that requires consideration of available evidence, rather than merely invok-
ing a presumption. These two arguments have different impacts on the
interpretation of MFN clauses, but both would suffice to preclude the appli-
cation of MFN clauses to already-existing more favorable BIT provisions in
at least some situations.
3. Interpretation of MFN Clauses and the
Interconnectedness of Treaty Rights
While the argument advanced in the preceding Subsection would justify
a blanket exclusion of preexisting BIT provisions from the application of
MFN clauses, it is also possible to make an argument for a more limited ex-
clusion, but one that is based on a stronger evidential foundation. As a
result, even if the blanket exclusion argued for above is rejected, a more
limited exclusion might still be applicable.
The argument for this more limited exclusion centers on interpretation
of the term "treatment" as used in an MFN clause. MFN clauses, after all,
are a promise that no more favorable "treatment" will be given to investors
from any third state than is given to investors from the beneficiary state.
What constitutes "treatment" under an MFN clause, however, is never speci-
fied, and hence must be determined by each tribunal that is faced with an
MFN-based argument.
The standard approach to evaluating an MFN-based argument involves
comparing the specific treaty provisions invoked by the investor.' That is,
if the investor is attempting to use the MFN clause in the Basic Treaty to al-
ter that treaty's dispute resolution provisions, a conventional analysis would
involve comparing those provisions with the dispute resolution provisions in
180. The knowledge need only be attributed to the beneficiary, not to those who negoti-
ated the treaty on its behalf.
181. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/7, Final Award (May 25, 2004) (comparing the relevant provisions of the applicable
Malaysia-Chile BIT with those of the Denmark-Chile and Croatia-Chile BITs).
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the third-state treaty. If the latter are judged to be more favorable, then the
MFN clause is held to be applicable.
Such an approach relies upon a contention that each treaty provision in
a treaty constitutes an identifiable form of treatment, independent of the
other clauses in the treaty. Without such a premise, a one-to-one comparison
of treaty provisions could not suffice to show that investors under the third-
state treaty are receiving more favorable "treatment" than investors under
the Basic Treaty. Of course, the alternative of viewing the "treatment" re-
ceived by an investor as constituting every provision of the applicable treaty,
acting together, is itself unworkable, as it would make any meaningful com-
parison impossible. Consequently, inclusion of an MFN clause would be
nonsensical, as it could never be successfully invoked.
A third approach serves as the foundation for the argument to be pre-
sented in this Subsection. This approach emphasizes that treaty negotiation
is not a clause-by-clause matter, with each provision being agreed before
another is addressed. Rather, treaty negotiation is fundamentally a more
interrelated enterprise, with substantively unconnected elements of the
treaty often being used as trade-offs: one party getting its preferred language
in the first clause in exchange for the other party getting its preferred lan-




Because of this interconnectedness of treaty negotiation, an agreement
between State A and State B to include, for example, restrictions on access
to investor-state arbitration in the A-B BIT, need not reflect an unwilling-
ness of one of the states to grant unrestricted access to investor-state
arbitration. For example, it may simply be that what State B requested from
State A in exchange for unrestricted access to investor-state arbitration was
something State A was unwilling to give. That is, the existence of the re-
striction might represent a failure of negotiation rather than an agreed level
of treatment.
This does not mean that there is no identifiable "treatment" of investors
that was agreed between A and B. Rather, it means that the "treatment" con-
sists of a combination of the restricted dispute resolution procedure included
in the treaty, and the provision(s) with which it was connected during nego-
tiations. The dispute resolution procedure, that is, was agreed as part of a
broader package, and it is this broader package that constitutes the "treat-
ment" of the investor from the perspective of an MFN clause.183
182. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search
for a Grand Bargain, in 19 ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 51, 87 (Norbert
Horn ed., 2004) ("[F]rom the point of view of negotiation theory, the more issues that can be
addressed in a multilateral negotiation the more trade-offs that the parties can devise. And
the greater possible trade-offs that negotiating parties have, the more likely they are to find a
basis for agreement.").
183. That is, the package constituting only those provisions with which the dispute res-
olution provided was connected during negotiations, rather than the broader "package"
constituted by the entire treaty.
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Of course there will rarely be information available to a tribunal as to
which aspects of the treaty were connected in this way during negotiations.
Consequently, it might seem that this broader conception of "treatment" is
of no use to a tribunal faced with an MFN-based argument. However, it is
unnecessary for a tribunal actually to identify which treaty provisions were
used as trade-offs against one another. Rather, all the tribunal must do is find
adequate evidence that such a trade-off took place.
For example, the tribunal may note that in the B-C BIT, entered into
prior to the A-B BIT, State B was willing to agree to unrestricted investor-
state dispute resolution. Absent evidence of a change in policy by State B
between negotiation of the two BITs, it is then reasonable to conclude that
State B was willing to agree to unrestricted investor-state arbitration in the
A-B BIT. Similarly, the tribunal may find that there is no evidence that State
A was unwilling to agree to unrestricted investor-state arbitration. As a re-
sult, a rebuttable presumption must arise that unrestricted investor-state
arbitration was an option during negotiations for the A-B BIT, but that re-
strictions were imposed anyway.
The tribunal need simply conclude that since both parties were willing
to agree to unrestricted investor-state arbitration, but nonetheless ultimately
imposed restrictions, the most plausible explanation is that the dispute reso-
lution provisions were not negotiated independently, but were instead linked
to another provision or provisions during negotiations. The limitations on
dispute resolution were part of a broader package of treatment, in which
those limitations were imposed as a result of a failure to agree to alternative
terms on one or more other provisions.
Nonetheless, whatever other provisions were included in this broader
"treatment," the available evidence indicates that unrestricted dispute resolu-
tion was expressly rejected by the parties. As argued in the previous
Subsection, though, if the MFN clause in the A-B BIT is interpreted as ap-
plying to provisions in the preexisting B-C BIT, the restrictions on dispute
resolution in the A-B BIT will never come into force. Consequently, given
that information on the B-C BIT was easily accessible to both states, it
would have made no sense for States A and B to agree on limited investor-
state arbitration as part of a broader package of "treatment," only to have
those limitations removed as soon as the A-B BIT came into effect. This
would involve giving away for free something for which a price was clearly
being asked during negotiations.
This second argument, therefore, also justifies interpreting the MFN
clause in the A-B BIT as not applying to the dispute resolution provisions of
the B-C BIT. However, it does so in a more limited fashion than the first ar-
gument. That is, while a conclusion derived from this second argument has
the benefit of being based on evidence, rather than on a mere presumption,
it is also limited in that if the evidence is not sufficient, the argument fails.
There might be, for example, evidence that at the time the A-B BIT was ne-
gotiated, State A had a policy opposing unrestricted investor-state
arbitration. In such a situation, an alternative explanation for the incorpora-
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tion of restricted investor-state arbitration into the BIT exists, and it is un-
necessary to appeal to negotiation trade-offs. As a result, there would be
inadequate justification for interpreting the MFN clause in the A-B BIT as
not applying to the dispute resolution provisions of the B-C BIT.
It is also important, however, to emphasize precisely what is precluded
by this argument, as it differs from what is precluded by the first argument.
The first argument resulted in a blanket exception of the application of the
MFN clause to all preexisting BIT provisions. The exception created by this
second argument, on the other hand, relates not to preexisting BIT provi-
sions, but to a particular type of provision. That is, it is based on a
conclusion by the tribunal that the parties most probably considered and re-
jected unrestricted investor-state arbitration. As a result, it is the substantive
agreement to unrestricted investor-state arbitration that is excluded from the
application of the MFN clause, not mere appeal to the B-C BIT. The follow-
ing Subsection addresses the importance of this distinction between the two
arguments.
4. MFN Clauses and Subsequent Adoptions of Already-Existing
More Favorable Treatment
The preceding two Subsections have offered two approaches to the is-
sue of the application of MFN clauses to treatment of a third state already in
existence at the time the treaty containing the MFN clause comes into ef-
fect. As will be demonstrated, however, these two arguments have
significantly different effects on the impact of the subsequent adoption by a
state of already-existing more favorable treatment.
Even if it is determined, for example, that investors from State A should
not receive the unrestricted access to investor-state arbitration already avail-
able to investors from State C when the A-B BIT came into effect, State B
may nonetheless subsequently negotiate a further BIT with State D that also
includes unrestricted access to investor-state arbitration. The question this
raises is whether investors from State A could then gain unrestricted access
to investor-state arbitration through the B-D treaty, even though they were
precluded from doing so through the B-C treaty.
The difference in this context between the two arguments offered above
arises from the rationales on which each argument is based. The first argu-
ment is based upon a determination that the MFN clause in the A-B BIT
must be understood not to refer to already-existing third-state BIT provi-
sions, due to the implausibility that the parties would have adopted a treaty
provision with the knowledge that it would have absolutely no effect.
Yet a subsequent adoption by State B of precisely the same treatment
with respect to State D would not have the effect of making the original ne-
gotiation of the language in the A-B BIT pointless. After all, had the B-C
treaty never existed, there would be no question that the MFN clause in the
A-B BIT would be applicable to the terms of the B-D BIT. A tribunal that
adopted the first argument in refusing to apply the MFN clause in the A-B
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BIT to give investors from State A the unrestricted access to investor-state
arbitration included in the B-C treaty would nonetheless remain perfectly
free to grant that access via the B-D treaty.
By contrast, the second argument, focusing upon the interconnectedness
of treaty negotiation, ultimately relies upon a conclusion that the states party
to the BIT containing the MFN clause had considered and rejected a partic-
ular type of provision. As a result, a tribunal adopting this second argument
as a ground for rejecting the applicability of the MFN clause in the A-B BIT
to the dispute resolution procedures in the B-C BIT does so on the ground
that the MFN clause in the A-B BIT simply cannot be a means of
incorporating unrestricted investor-state arbitration into the A-B BIT. The
subsequent adoption of precisely the same substantive treatment in the B-D
treaty, therefore, would fail by precisely the same argument.
18 4
Ultimately, then, while both of the arguments advanced here provide a
justification for holding MFN clauses to be inapplicable to at least some
types of preexisting treatment, they are nonetheless importantly different,
and significantly different impacts will result from a tribunal's adoption of
one of the arguments rather than the other.
C. Nonstate Beneficiaries of MFN Clauses in BITs as Classes,
Not Individual Claimants
The preceding Sections of the Article have addressed potential exclu-
sions of the applicability of MFN clauses to substantive treaty promises, but
no analysis has as yet been made regarding the nature of the beneficiaries of
an MFN clause. While for most noninvestment treaties this question may
have an obvious answer, it is a more complex issue in the international in-
vestment law context, as MFN clauses in BITs do not generally refer to the
contracting states but to their "investors." '
In response to this situation, it might be argued that MFN-based claims
should be approached as though they require that any evaluation of the "fa-
vorability" of treatment be done with reference to the particular individual
bringing the claim. The claimant, after all, is the "investor," and hence pre-
sumably the subject of the reference in the MFN clause. The goal of this
Section of the Article is to demonstrate that this approach is mistaken, and
that evaluations of the favorability of treatment must be made with respect
to the class of investors from which the claimant in an arbitration has come,
rather than with respect to the claimant itself.
184. Of course, this argument only applies to subsequent adoptions of already-existing
treatment, and the MFN clause would remain fully applicable to all subsequently adopted
treaty provisions that did not mirror already-existing treatment.
185. An MFN clause may refer to "investments" rather than "investors," or indeed may
refer to both. However, to simplify the explanation being made here, only "investors" will be
used. Nonetheless, precisely the same argument as made in this Section with respect to in-
vestors can be made with respect to investments.
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The initial indication that it is the class of investors from which the
claimant in an arbitration comes that is the beneficiary of an MFN clause in
a BIT comes simply from the language adopted in such a clause. The claim-
ant, after all, is not only not a signatory to the BIT, but is also nowhere
referenced in it. That is, rather than including a promise that MFN treatment
will be provided to this specific investor, the BIT will include merely a gen-
eralized reference to "investors," a class to which this particular investor
belongs. It might nonetheless be argued that although the collective term
"investors" is used, it is used as a means of referring individually to each
member of the class, rather than referring collectively to the class as a
whole. In the same manner, someone who says "I fed my children dinner" is
not saying that he somehow gave food to an abstract class of children, of
which his individual children happen to be members. Rather, the clear
meaning is that he provided food individually to each of his children. If the
collective reference to "investors" in a BIT is understood as also operating
in this individualized manner, then the relevant reference for the evaluation
of favorability would remain the claimant investor, rather than the broader
class from which it came.
However, the "instantaneous obligation" understanding of MFN clauses
in investment treaties simply makes such an individualized interpretation of
the term "investor" unworkable. 6 Presume, for example, that in 1990 State
A and State B entered into a BIT that includes an MFN clause. Then, in
1995, State B entered into a BIT with State C that includes a more favorable
fair and equitable treatment provision than the one included in the A-B BIT.
As a result of the instantaneous effect of MFN clauses, that more favorable
fair and equitable treatment provision is incorporated into the A-B BIT in
1995, as soon as the B-C BIT comes into force.
Importantly, however, some investors from State A will not even have
invested in State B as of 1995. In addition, few of those who have invested
prior to 1995 will have a claim against State B as of that date. As a result, no
facts about investors from State A, their investments, or the bases of their
claims can be relevant to determining whether the treatment provided to in-
vestors from State C is indeed more favorable than that provided to
investors from State A. The information is simply not there to be consid-
ered.
Only an evaluation of favorability with respect to investors from State A
as a class can possibly support a conclusion that the broader fair and equi-
table treatment provision included in the B-C BIT was also applicable to
investors from State A as of 1995. This is precisely the conclusion mandated
by the instantaneous effect of MFN clauses.
The consequence of this is that the proper evaluation to be undertaken
by a tribunal addressing an MFN-based claim is not whether the treatment
claimed by the investor would be more favorable to the specific investor
bringing the claim. It must, rather, be whether the treatment in question
186. See supra Parts IV.A. 1-2.
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would be more favorable to investors from the claimant's Home State as a
class.
As the following Section argues, however, moving the focus of a favor-
ability evaluation from the claimant to the class of investors from which the
claimant comes can cause an enormous change in the impact an MFN
clause has on an investor. Indeed, it can have the consequence that an MFN




D. The "Exclusionary Effect" of an MFN Clause
That MFN clauses only serve to provide "more favorable" treatment to
investors might be taken to imply that there is no circumstance in which a
respondent state in an arbitration would be able to invoke an MFN clause as
a defense against an investor's claims. After all, if the application of an
MFN clause to a particular type of third-state treatment would harm an in-
vestor, that treatment would hardly be "more favorable" for it. However, as
the preceding Section argued, this view is fundamentally flawed, as it bases
the evaluation of the favorability of third-state treatment on the individual
claimant in an arbitration, rather than on the class from which the claimant
comes. This Section of the Article demonstrates that MFN clauses can in
fact harm an investor and hence can indeed be used by respondent states as
a defense against an investor's claims.
Presume that in 1990 State A and State B signed a BIT that includes an
MFN clause, as well as a consent to investor-state arbitration restricted to
claims for expropriation. Subsequently, in 1995, State B signed a BIT with
State C that includes a consent to investor-state arbitration for a wide variety
of claims, but not including expropriation. Presuming that this latter consent
is indeed more favorable than the narrower consent in the A-B BIT, the in-
stantaneous effect of MFN clauses means that as of 1995 the broader
consent to arbitration in the B-C BIT is incorporated into the A-B BIT.
It is important to note that the MFN clause in the A-B BIT only consti-
tutes a promise that investors from third states will not be treated better than
investors from State A. As discussed in the historical survey at the beginning
of the Article, MFN clauses are a means of providing equality with competi-
tors, not superiority. 8' The MFN clause in the A-B BIT only provides
investors from State A with treatment equal to that received by investors
from State C. It cannot provide them with better treatment.
Investors from State C, however, cannot bring expropriation claims to
investor-state arbitration, as such claims are not covered by the consent to
arbitration in the B-C BIT. Consequently, were investors from State A able
to retain their right to bring expropriation claims, while also gaining the
187. The MFN clause may, for example, serve to preclude an investor's claim, if the in-
vestor is uncharacteristic of investors from its Home State, and the MFN clause has altered
the terms of the Basic Treaty in a way that will benefit that larger class of investors.
188. See supra notes 48, 129, and accompanying text.
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right to bring claims under the terms of the B-C BIT, they would actually be
receiving better treatment than investors from State C.
It must be, therefore, that as soon as investors from State A gain the
ability to bring claims under the consent to arbitration in the B-C treaty, they
simultaneously lose the right to bring claims under the consent to arbitration
in the A-B treaty. That is, MFN clauses incorporate more favorable treat-
ment given to third parties, but in so doing exclude the treatment originally
promised in the treaty in which they are contained. This element of the op-
eration of MFN clauses is what is here called the exclusionary effect of an
MFN clause.
This may initially appear to be a minor point, given that the MFN
clause will only incorporate treatment given to third parties where that
treatment is more favorable to the beneficiary of the clause. However, as
was made clear in the previous Section, the proper standard for determining
whether an MFN clause incorporates treatment into the BIT in which it is
contained is not whether the treatment in question would be more favorable
to the investor bringing the arbitration, but whether it would be more favor-
able to the class referred to in the MFN clause, such as investors from State
A.
To return to the example, it would presumably be more favorable to in-
vestors from State A as a class to have access to a broad dispute resolution
provision, even one that does not include expropriation. There is, after all,
no way of knowing in advance the specific grounds on which investors may
need to bring a claim. Consequently, the broader consent to investor-state
arbitration in the B-C BIT will replace the narrower consent originally in-
cluded in the A-B BIT through the operation of the MFN clause.
This will have the effect, however, of preventing any investor from State
A from bringing to arbitration a claim of expropriation. The effect of the
MFN clause in the A-B BIT will, therefore, by no means be "more favora-
ble" to investors whose only claim is one of expropriation, as they will lose
their ability to bring any claim at all.
The exclusionary effect of an MFN clause, then, once understood in the
context of the class-based nature of MFN beneficiaries under BITs, can ac-
tually serve to make MFN clauses harmful to specific investors. In turn, it
can give respondent states a reason to invoke MFN clauses as a defense to
an investor's claim, in opposition to the traditional view that they are merely
a mechanism to be used by investors.
CONCLUSION
MFN clauses have gained their current importance in international in-
vestment law primarily because of the interaction between such clauses and
investor-state arbitration. Nonetheless, international investment arbitration
tribunals have done little to explicate the operation of MFN clauses in the
international investment context, focusing instead on the perceived teleolog-
ical nature of such clauses. The goal of this Article has been to demonstrate
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that this teleological nondiscrimination approach to the interpretation of
MFN clauses both is inconsistent with the historical development of MFN
clauses and fails to recognize certain limitations on MFN clauses that follow
necessarily from their incorporation into international investment agree-
ments.
An analysis of the boundaries of MFN clauses in international invest-
ment law is not worth pursuing solely for academic curiosity. A full
understanding of MFN clauses makes clear that they are enormously power-
ful instruments that can impede significantly a state's otherwise legitimate
regulatory activities. Nonetheless, despite the power of MFN clauses, they
are almost routinely incorporated into contemporary BITs, as though they
constitute little more than a political statement of friendship with no legal
consequences. The hope underlying this Article is that once the operation of
MFN clauses in international investment agreements is more clearly under-
stood, they will be used more circumspectly.
